United States v. Dytaniel McBride
2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 15294
| 7th Cir. | 2013Background
- Defendant owned/operated a clothing store used as a drug front; convicted at a bench trial of drug offenses, conspiracy to launder money (18 U.S.C. § 1956(h)), and arson (18 U.S.C. § 844(i)).
- Government later confessed a sentencing error: the district judge added four levels for money laundering (should have been two) and misapplied the multiple-counts adjustment, producing offense level 43 (life) instead of 42 (360 months–life).
- The money‑laundering conspiracy rested largely on girlfriend Deshawn Boyett’s deposits (~$270,000) into the store’s bank account; Boyett pleaded guilty separately to money‑laundering conspiracy.
- Defendant argued Boyett was an unwitting helper and thus could not be a co‑conspirator; the judge found she was willfully blind/aware and therefore a conspirator.
- Arson evidence was sparse: defendant set fire to the store at 2 a.m. using gasoline‑soaked towels; the record lacked proof about building size, ownership, extent of damage, or firefighting response—yet government argued use of an accelerant made arson per se.
- Court accepted the government’s confession of sentencing error, reversed the arson conviction (finding the government’s arson theory untenable on the record), affirmed other convictions, and remanded for resentencing in light of the acquittal and sentencing correction.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Proper Guidelines calculation / remand | Gov't concedes judge miscalculated guideline levels and seeks remand for resentencing to correct offense level to 42 | Defendant agreed resentencing appropriate but appealed convictions that affect guideline calculation | Court treated gov't filing as confession of error but declined immediate resentencing; remanded for resentencing after resolving convictions (accepted gov't sentencing error) |
| Conspiracy to launder (sufficiency of co‑conspirator knowledge) | Gov't: Boyett’s deposits and her awareness of defendant’s drug dealing permit finding she knowingly participated (or was willfully blind) | Defendant: Boyett was an unwitting helper; without a culpable co‑conspirator the conspiracy charge fails | Court: Affirmed. Boyett’s knowledge or willful blindness supported conviction; two‑person conspiracy is sufficient under law |
| Arson (meaning of "maliciously" / use of accelerant) | Gov't: Use of an accelerant that causes damage supports arson conviction; argued arson per se when accelerant used | Defendant: He owned (or leased) the building and acted without malice to harm others; sparse record leaves doubt whether fire created risk to others | Court: Reversed arson conviction. Government’s theory that accelerant use equals arson per se is untenable; record lacked findings on ownership, size, damage, or risk to others, so prosecution failed to prove maliciousness |
Key Cases Cited
- Smith v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 714 (2013) (conspiracy requires agreement between defendant and at least one other person)
- Global‑Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 131 S. Ct. 2060 (2011) (willful blindness can equate to knowledge)
- Santos v. United States, 553 U.S. 507 (2008) (discussing knowledge and mens rea issues in money cases)
- United States v. Gracia, 272 F.3d 866 (7th Cir. 2001) (discussed in context of multi‑participant laundering conspiracies)
- United States v. Emerson, 128 F.3d 557 (7th Cir. 1997) (definition of conspiracy as combination of two or more people)
- Jones v. United States, 529 U.S. 848 (2000) (occupancy/use considerations bearing on arson statute)
- United States v. Corona, 108 F.3d 565 (5th Cir. 1997) (interpreting "maliciously" in arson context)
- United States v. Gullett, 75 F.3d 941 (4th Cir. 1996) (malice and arson distinctions)
- United States v. Zendeli, 180 F.3d 879 (7th Cir. 1999) (burning own property can be malicious where it endangers others or is fraudulent)