United States v. Dwayne Toland
17-1006
| 6th Cir. | Nov 22, 2017Background
- Toland worked as a Detroit broker for Bernardo Santana, a Dominican Republic–based heroin supplier; government wiretaps captured coded conversations between Santana and Toland about large heroin shipments.
- Recordings and DEA testimony identified code words (e.g., “persons,” “family,” “documents”) as references to kilograms and money; Toland later admitted that complaints about “moist” product referred to heroin.
- A 3‑kg shipment was transported from Chicago to Detroit; Toland stored the courier’s jeep overnight, and agents later found $133,000 inside.
- Co‑defendant Norfleet was linked by phone records to Toland and was found with ~800 grams of heroin and trafficking paraphernalia after agents searched his home.
- Toland’s residence, searched later, contained scales, vacuum sealer, money counter, gloves, and guns; Toland was indicted, tried, acquitted on a gun charge, convicted of conspiracy, and sentenced to 140 months based on a finding of at least 3 kg involvement.
Issues
| Issue | Toland’s Argument | Government’s/Respondent’s Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sufficiency of evidence for conspiracy conviction | Toland argued he lacked knowledge and participation and was convicted by association | Wiretap calls, his admissions, transactions (storage of jeep), and contraband support knowing participation | Conviction upheld — evidence sufficient under Jackson standard and conspiracy law (Wettstain) |
| Admissibility of co‑conspirator statements under Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(E) | Admission was improper because the district court didn’t make Rule 801(d)(2)(E) preliminary findings | Conspiracy and Toland’s membership proven; statements were in furtherance (prompting distribution) | Error in not making findings was harmless — court confident government met preponderance burden; statements admissible |
| Alleged variance (multiple conspiracies vs. single conspiracy charged) | Evidence showed separate conspiracies (Toland–Santana, Santana–Norfleet, Santana–Lebron) inconsistent with indictment | Evidence showed a common goal, overlapping participants, and single scheme to distribute Santana’s heroin in Detroit | No plain‑error reversal; evidence supports single conspiracy theory at trial |
| Expert testimony and dual‑role testimony by DEA agent Sullivan | Sullivan lacked qualifications; testimony was unhelpful/irrelevant; improper to give both facts and expert opinion | Sullivan had extensive DEA experience; testimony decoded jargon and was clearly demarcated; judge gave cautionary instruction | No abuse of discretion — agent qualified; testimony relevant/helpful; dual role sufficiently demarcated and instructed |
| Speedy Trial Act / Sixth Amendment delay claims | Toland argued detention-to-indictment delay and violation of §3161(b)/(c) and Sixth Amendment | Temporary detention is not an ‘‘arrest’’ under the Speedy Trial Act; Sixth Amendment right had not attached pre‑charges | Claims fail: detention not an arrest for §3161(b); Sixth Amendment not yet triggered; §3161(c) claim forfeited and ineffective‑assistance claim premature |
| Sentencing drug‑quantity (3 kg) | Toland contested that his conduct involved 3+ kg | Court may rely on preponderance, estimates, and reasonably foreseeable co‑conspirator quantities | Finding of at least 3 kg not clearly erroneous; sentence affirmed |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Wettstain, 618 F.3d 577 (6th Cir. 2010) (elements and review standard for drug conspiracy)
- Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979) (standard for sufficiency of the evidence review)
- United States v. Warman, 578 F.3d 320 (6th Cir. 2009) (Rule 801(d)(2)(E) requirements and conspiracy evidence analysis)
- United States v. Lopez‑Medina, 461 F.3d 724 (6th Cir. 2006) (qualifying DEA agent to give expert testimony on drug trafficking)
- United States v. Kilpatrick, 798 F.3d 365 (6th Cir. 2015) (standard of review for evidentiary rulings)
- United States v. Salgado, 250 F.3d 438 (6th Cir. 2001) (temporary detention is not an ‘‘arrest’’ under the Speedy Trial Act)
- United States v. Loud Hawk, 474 U.S. 302 (1986) (Sixth Amendment speedy‑trial right attaches upon the initiation of formal proceedings)
- United States v. Okayfor, 996 F.2d 116 (6th Cir. 1993) (including reasonably foreseeable co‑conspirator quantities at sentencing)