United States v. Dwayne Garrett, 757 F.3d 560

Background

ATF wiretapped calls between Dwayne Garrett and Isaiah Hicks; intercepted a call where Garrett ordered nine ounces of crack and agents surveilled a planned transaction at a pizza-restaurant parking lot.
Garrett and co-defendant Patrick Jones arrived in Garrett’s purple Chrysler; an observed hand-to-hand exchange occurred and Hicks later called to confirm satisfaction.
Officers stopped Garrett, found $1,100 and a cell phone; Jones fled, discarded baggies later recovered and identified as crack (total ~241 g across four bags).
Garrett made post-arrest statements admitting he purchased nine ounces that day; he later allegedly confessed to buying ~2 kg from Hicks over a year; he also allegedly consented to a phone search linking Hicks’s number.
Trial: jury convicted Garrett of possession with intent to distribute 50+ grams of crack and using a phone to facilitate the offense; judge admitted ATF Agent Labno as both fact and opinion witness (without calling him an “expert” before jury).
Sentencing: PSR attributed 840 g–2.8 kg to Garrett (base offense level 34) based on Labno’s account of Garrett’s admissions; court used offense level 33 range (after adjustments) and sentenced Garrett to 190 months. Garrett appealed.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Garrett)	Defendant's Argument (Government)	Held
Suppression of post-arrest statements and cell-phone search	Statements and phone contents should be suppressed for lack of probable cause and lack of consent to phone search	Intercepted calls, observed exchange, cash, Jones’s flight and recovered drugs gave probable cause; court credited agent’s testimony that Garrett consented	Denial of suppression affirmed: probable cause existed for arrest and district court did not clearly err in crediting consent testimony
Admission of Agent Labno’s expert/opinion testimony	Labno’s expert testimony was prejudicial and impermissibly bolstered prosecution because he investigated the case	Testimony on drug trade terminology, quantities, and practices was relevant; court avoided calling him an expert in front of jury and gave limiting instructions	No abuse of discretion: admission allowed because the court took precautions (no ‘‘expert’’ label to jury, separate fact/opinion phases, jury instructions)
Jury instruction prohibiting consideration of punishment	Jury needed to understand that its quantity finding could affect mandatory minimums; instruction misled jurors by excluding sentence consequences	Jurors should not consider punishment; judge properly instructed jury to decide guilt only and leave sentencing to the court	Instruction upheld: properly stated law and did not mislead jury; no prosecutorial misstatement alleged
Sentencing calculation — failure to state explicit drug-quantity finding	Court improperly attributed large drug quantity (840 g–2.8 kg) without explicitly stating or explaining the quantity finding or reliable evidence supporting it	Court relied on PSR and agent testimony; judge questioned PSR reliability and adjusted offense level but did not articulate a precise quantity	Sentence vacated and remanded: district court erred by failing to explicitly state drug-quantity finding and identify reliable evidence; Guidelines calculation inadequate (Alleyne constraints noted)

Key Cases Cited

Corley v. United States, 556 U.S. 303 (2009) (courts must assess reasonableness of post-arrest delay beyond six hours before admitting confessions)
United States v. Biggs, 491 F.3d 616 (7th Cir. 2007) (probable-cause standard and deference to suppression-hearing credibility findings)
United States v. Upton, 512 F.3d 394 (7th Cir. 2008) (standards and cautions for admitting law-enforcement expert testimony in drug cases)
Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007) (two-step sentencing review: correctly calculate Guidelines range, then reasonableness review)
Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151 (2013) (any fact that increases mandatory minimum must be submitted to a jury)