United States v. Dwain D. Williams
509 F. App'x 899
11th Cir.2013Background
- Williams was convicted in the Middle District of Georgia of three offenses involving sexual conduct with a child while Williams accompanied Armed Forces abroad (Okinawa, Japan).
- Counts: (1) travel in foreign commerce and illicit sexual conduct under 18 U.S.C. § 2423(c),(e); (2) aggravated sexual abuse of a child under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2241(c), 3261(a)(1); (3) abusive sexual contact with a child under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2241(a), 3261(a)(1).
- Subject matter jurisdiction for counts 2–3 rests on the MEJA, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3261–3267, due to conduct outside U.S. territory.
- Evidence showed sexual abuse of Williams’s step-daughter A.F. during residence in Okinawa; Williams’s wife was transferred to Georgia, and Williams later worked in Afghanistan.
- Williams was arrested in Georgia; indictment and trial occurred in U.S. courts, with the alleged conduct arising in Japan.
- The district court sentenced Williams to life imprisonment followed by lifetime supervised release on count 1, creating a potential improper general sentence across all counts.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Is MEJA constitutional as applied to conduct outside U.S. jurisdiction? | Williams argues MEJA criminalizes outside-jurisdiction conduct in violation of constitutional limits. | MEJA comports with Article III and the Fifth and Sixth Amendments; venue is proper. | MEJA constitutional; venue and jury rights are satisfied. |
| Does MEJA violate the Sixth Amendment right to compulsory process by limiting subpoena power over foreign witnesses? | Williams claims lack of foreign-witness subpoena power impairs compulsory process. | No violation without plausible showing witnesses would be material and favorable. | No compulsory-process violation; Williams did not show materiality or favorability. |
| Whether the sentence constituted an impermissible general sentence | Aggregate sentence exceeded the maximum for count 1, rendering the sentence invalid as a general sentence. | Agreement that remand is appropriate; need clarification of sentence per count. | Remanded for correction/clarification of the sentence, including per-count terms; general-sentence defect acknowledged. |
Key Cases Cited
- Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957) (civilian dependents cannot be court-martialed for capital offenses; indictment/jury rights considerations debated)
- Kinsella v. United States ex rel. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234 (1960) (extension of federal jurisdiction over civilian defendants via alternative to court-martial; discussion of federal jurisdiction)
- United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858 (1982) (plaintiff must show material and favorable witness testimony for compulsory-process rights)
- United States v. Woodward, 938 F.2d 1255 (11th Cir. 1991) (definition of a general sentence within this circuit)
- United States v. Moriarty, 429 F.3d 1012 (11th Cir. 2005) (general-sentence rule; remand for correction)
- United States v. Martinez, 606 F.3d 1303 (11th Cir. 2010) (remand authority on sentence vacatur; §2106 mandate)