United States v. Doss, 630 F.3d 1181

Doss was convicted of sex trafficking of children, transportation of minors into prostitution, conspiracy, and two counts of witness tampering, receiving a life sentence on several counts and concurrent terms on others.
The central legal question is whether §1512(b) can convict for witnessing tampering by urging a witness to withhold testimony when the witness has a legal right or privilege not to testify.
A prior-conviction (for a life sentence) determination used Taylor's modified categorical approach to assess whether the prior Nevada offense involved a minor under 17.
Count 8 (Doss and his wife Ford) was reversed because persuading a spouse to exercise a marital privilege to refuse testifying was not necessarily the corrupt persuasion required by §1512.
Count 7 (C.F.) was upheld because the evidence could show Doss urged C.F. to lie or not testify, violating §1512.
The court remanded Counts 4–6 for resentencing under Nijhawan’s circumstance-specific approach to determine if the prior conviction involved a minor, with possible recalibration of the life sentence; Count 2 may be reconsidered if no mandatory life sentence is required.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether urging a witness to exercise a Fifth Amendment right can violate §1512(b)	Doss argues no §1512 violation where witness has a privilege.	Doss contends urging privilege-exercising is inherently non-corrupt.	Partially affirmed; some counts vacated/reversed; others affirmed.
Count 8—whether persuading a spouse to invoke marital privilege is corrupt	Government argues §1512 covers non-coercive with respect to privilege when improper purpose.	Doss argues maritial privilege persuasion is not inherently corrupt.	Count 8 reversed; conviction vacated.
Count 7—sufficiency of evidence to convict for witness tampering	Evidence showed Doss urged CF to lie by insinuating consequences.	Defense argues no explicit threat; could be non-coercive.	Count 7 affirmed.
Sentencing enhancement under §3559(e) and Nijhawan impact	Government relies on Taylor/Shepard approach for prior conviction.	Nijhawan requires circumstance-specific proof of minor involved.	Remand Counts 4–6 for new, beyond-reasonable-doubt sentencing; consider minor involvement; Count 2 may be reconsidered.

Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696 (U.S. 2005) (knowingly corruptly persuaded requires conscious wrongdoing; marital privilege example)
United States v. Khatami, 280 F.3d 907 (9th Cir. 2002) (limits of §1512(b) regarding non-coercive persuasion to lie or privilege contexts)
United States v. Baldridge, 559 F.3d 1126 (10th Cir. 2009) (ambiguity of corruptly persuade; circuit split analyzed)
United States v. Thompson, 76 F.3d 442 (2d Cir. 1996) (persuasion with improper purpose may violate §1512(b))
United States v. Shotts, 145 F.3d 1289 (11th Cir. 1998) (adopts improper-purpose approach to corrupt persuasion)
United States v. Farrell, 126 F.3d 484 (3d Cir. 1997) (defines ‘corruptly’ as more than hindering investigation; mentions privilege and non-coercive context)
United States v. Gotti, 459 F.3d 296 (2d Cir. 2006) (extends corrupt persuasion theory to Fifth Amendment context)