United States v. Donald Clark Luger, 837 F.3d 870

Defendant Jody Luger was indicted for aggravated sexual abuse of a child (Count 1, ~1997/1999) and two counts relating to a 2011 allegation; Counts 2–3 were later dismissed at judgment of acquittal.
Government sought to admit prior-act propensity evidence under Fed. R. Evid. 413/414 from five women; district court excluded testimony of three adult-victim witnesses but admitted testimony of two who were teenagers when assaulted (M.N. and S.C.).
At trial T.L. (charged-victim for Count 1) testified to abuse when she was 13; E.C.G. (charged-victim for Counts 2–3) recanted and the government’s case on those counts failed. Jury convicted on Count 1.
After sentencing disclosures, Luger moved to disqualify the U.S. Attorney’s Office (USAO) for a conflict: U.S. Attorney Purdon had previously represented Luger. District court initially granted disqualification, but upon government reconsideration (with additional exhibits) vacated that order and denied disqualification.
Luger moved for a new trial based on the newly produced evidence about Purdon’s conflict; the district court found Purdon had been adequately screened and denied a new trial. Luger appealed.

Issue	Luger’s Argument	Government’s Argument	Held
Admissibility of prior-act testimony under Rules 413/414 (motion in limine)	M.N. and S.C.’s prior assaults were too dissimilar and overly prejudicial	Prior acts involved teenage victims, similar circumstances, probative of propensity; not unfairly prejudicial	Affirmed: district court did not abuse discretion in admitting M.N. and S.C. testimony
Granting government’s motion for reconsideration of USAO disqualification	Government improperly introduced evidence on reconsideration that was available earlier; reconsideration should not be used to present previously available evidence	Government’s additional exhibits show adequate screening of Purdon; reconsideration was within district court’s discretion	Affirmed: any error was harmless because only resentencing (which Luger does not seek) would follow and Luger suffered no prejudice
Denial of motion for new trial based on Purdon conflict	Conflict (and filings showing Purdon’s name) created appearance/actual unfairness warranting new trial	Purdon was adequately screened; no substantive involvement or prejudice shown	Affirmed: district court did not abuse discretion; no evidence of prejudice or substantive participation

United States v. Gabe, 237 F.3d 954 (8th Cir. 2001) (review of admission under Rules 413/414 for abuse of discretion)
United States v. Mound, 149 F.3d 799 (8th Cir. 1998) (Rules 413/414 constitutional subject to Rule 403 limits)
United States v. LeCompte, 131 F.3d 767 (8th Cir. 1997) (Legislative judgment favoring admission of prior sexual-offense evidence)
United States v. Crow Eagle, 705 F.3d 325 (8th Cir. 2013) (prior-offense similarity required for probative value)
United States v. Hollow Horn, 523 F.3d 882 (8th Cir. 2008) (deference to district court’s Rule 403 balancing)
Julianello v. K-V Pharm. Co., 791 F.3d 915 (8th Cir. 2015) (motion for reconsideration limited function)
United States v. Metro. St. Louis Sewer Dist., 440 F.3d 930 (8th Cir. 2006) (motion for reconsideration standards)
United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499 (U.S. 1983) (harmless error review cited regarding prejudice inquiry)
United States v. Dodd, 391 F.3d 930 (8th Cir. 2004) (standard of review for denial of new trial)
United States v. Singer, 710 F.2d 431 (8th Cir. 1983) (defendant entitled to trial that appears and is fair)
Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787 (U.S. 1987) (involvement of conflicted prosecutor can be fundamental constitutional error)