United States v. Donald Blankenship, 19 F.4th 685

April 5, 2010 Upper Big Branch mine explosion killed 29 miners; Donald Blankenship was then Massey CEO and later indicted for conspiring to willfully violate federal mine‑safety laws (30 U.S.C. § 820(d), 18 U.S.C. § 371).
Government’s trial case centered on willfulness: testimony from Massey safety officials (Bill Ross, Chris Blanchard), miners, and internal Massey documents showing production‑over‑safety pressures; Blankenship defended that violations were not willful and that he had promoted safety.
Jury convicted Blankenship of the misdemeanor conspiracy count; he was sentenced to 12 months and fined; this Court previously affirmed that conviction on direct appeal.
After trial, the government produced additional materials it had not disclosed: (1) memoranda summarizing interviews of seven former Massey employees (including Ross and Blanchard and five others some of whom appeared on Blankenship’s pretrial witness list), and (2) internal MSHA emails and disciplinary records showing hostile statements by some MSHA employees.
Blankenship filed a § 2255 motion claiming Brady/Giglio violations; the district court found suppression occurred but ruled the materials were not material (no reasonable probability of a different verdict) and denied relief. The Fourth Circuit granted a COA and affirmed.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Suppressed interview memoranda of Ross/Blanchard and five other Massey employees	Withheld memoranda contained exculpatory/impeaching statements that would undercut willfulness	Substance was elicited on cross‑examination for Ross/Blanchard; other employees were known/available to defense (on witness list) so Brady not triggered	Court: No prejudice — key substance was covered at trial or available to defense; suppression not material; no reasonable probability of different outcome
Suppressed MSHA internal emails and disciplinary records	Emails showed MSHA bias against Massey/Blankenship and would impeach agency evidence/citations	Emails were authored by non‑testifying employees, did not show agencywide bias or involvement in prosecution; much would be inadmissible or cumulative	Court: Not material — documents unlikely admissible or outcome‑determinative; suppression not a Brady/Giglio violation
Materiality standard and cumulative effect of undisclosed items	Cumulative suppressed evidence undermines confidence in verdict and meets Brady materiality	Materiality requires a reasonable probability favorable evidence would change result; record had substantial evidence of guilt	Court: Applied Kyles/Strickler/Bagley — no reasonable probability the verdict would differ when evidence considered collectively; affirmed

Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (prosecution must disclose exculpatory evidence)
Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (prosecution must disclose evidence useful for impeaching government witnesses)
Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 (materiality assessed on cumulative effect of suppressed evidence)
Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263 (Brady prejudice requires reasonable probability of different result)
United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (impeachment‑evidence materiality standard)
Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668 (prosecution may not conceal Brady material; defendants need not ‘‘scavenge’’ for such evidence when prosecution represents full disclosure)
Wood v. Bartholomew, 516 U.S. 1 (inadmissible evidence could not have affected trial outcome for Brady purposes)
Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78 (prosecutor’s duty is to seek justice, not just conviction)
United States v. Wilson, 901 F.2d 378 (4th Cir.) (no Brady violation where exculpatory information was available to defendant in sources a reasonable defendant would consult)
United States v. Blankenship, 846 F.3d 663 (4th Cir.) (prior appeal affirming Blankenship’s conviction)