United States v. Don Eugene Siegelman
2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 8297
| 11th Cir. | 2015Background
- Don Siegelman, former Alabama Governor, was convicted at trial of federal funds bribery, several honest-services mail-fraud counts tied to a $500,000 donation from Richard Scrushy (the Siegelman–Scrushy Exchange), and one obstruction count tied to sham transactions concealing a $9,200 payment (Siegelman–Young–Bailey Sham Transactions). He was acquitted of charges tied to a broader pay-for-play agreement with Lanny Young (Siegelman–Young Agreement).
- On initial appeal this Court reversed some convictions; the Supreme Court vacated and remanded for reconsideration in light of Skilling. On remand this Court again reversed certain counts and ordered resentencings (Siegelman II).
- Siegelman and co-defendant Scrushy each moved for a new trial based on evidence that U.S. Attorney Leura Canary, who had voluntarily disqualified herself, allegedly continued to influence the prosecution. Scrushy’s appeal resolved the same question earlier in this Court.
- The district court denied Siegelman’s Rule 33 motion and resentenced him to 78 months. The court’s Guidelines calculation included as “relevant conduct” the sham transactions and the Young agreement conduct, and it applied an obstruction adjustment and an upward departure for systemic corruption.
- On appeal Siegelman challenged (1) denial of his new-trial motion based on Canary’s alleged post-disqualification involvement, and (2) the district court’s relevant-conduct findings and resulting Guidelines calculations (bribe value, obstruction enhancement, and upward departure).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Canary’s alleged post-disqualification involvement violated the right to a disinterested prosecutor, warranting a new trial | Siegelman: Canary continued to communicate with and influence the prosecution after voluntary disqualification, triggering Young and requiring a new trial | Government: Scrushy already raised same evidence and this Court rejected it; law-of-the-case binds Siegelman | Denied—law of the case: Scrushy decision controls; record showed only limited involvement and no evidence Canary influenced prosecutorial decisions, so no Young violation |
| Whether the district court erred by failing to make explicit § 1B1.3 relevant-conduct findings | Siegelman: Court failed to explain why sham transactions and Young agreement qualified as relevant conduct, requiring reversal | Government: Although not explicit, the sentencing transcript and PSR show the court relied on that conduct; appellate review remains possible | Affirmed—no plain error: record makes clear which evidence the court credited, so explicit findings not required here |
| Whether the district court clearly erred in treating the sham transactions and Young agreement as relevant conduct under § 1B1.3 | Siegelman: These matters were unrelated and some were acquitted; they are not part of the same scheme and thus should not be included | Government: The conduct shares common accomplice, victim, purpose, and modus operandi; inclusion is plausible on the record | Affirmed—no clear error: connections (common accomplice Nick Bailey; common victim and purpose; similar modus operandi) make it plausible these were part of a common scheme |
| Whether Guidelines calculations based on that relevant conduct (value of bribe, obstruction enhancement, upward departure) were erroneous | Siegelman: Including acquitted or unrelated conduct inflated offense level and triggered enhancements and departures improperly | Government: Given relevant-conduct finding, the court properly counted the monies, applied obstruction enhancement for sham transactions, and justified upward departure for systemic corruption | Affirmed—the sentencing calculations and enhancements were permissible once relevant conduct determination stands; district court did not abuse discretion |
Key Cases Cited
- Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787 (1987) (appointment of an interested prosecutor is a structural defect requiring reversal when the interested party controls the prosecution)
- Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358 (2010) (clarified honest-services mail-fraud limits and prompted remand for reconsideration)
- United States v. Scrushy, 721 F.3d 1288 (11th Cir. 2013) (rejected new-trial claim based on Canary’s limited involvement; law-of-the-case applied here)
- United States v. Siegelman (Siegelman II), 640 F.3d 1159 (11th Cir. 2011) (appellate disposition on several convictions and remand for resentencing)
- United States v. White, 335 F.3d 1314 (11th Cir. 2003) (standards for clear-error review of relevant-conduct determinations)
- Pepper v. United States, 562 U.S. 476 (2011) (explaining law-of-the-case doctrine principle cited in opinion)
- United States v. Duncan, 400 F.3d 1297 (11th Cir. 2005) (relevant-conduct and use of acquitted conduct at sentencing)
