United States v. Dominguez, 998 F.3d 1094

Defendant Christopher Dominguez was arrested for linked pharmacy robberies in New Mexico and Wyoming; indictments included three § 924(c) counts (one New Mexico, two Wyoming).
Under the pre–First Step Act law, stacked § 924(c) convictions carried mandatory minimums that could total ~60 years; parties negotiated a Rule 11(c)(1)(C) plea for four counts resolving both indictments with a total 28‑year sentence.
At the December 21, 2018 change‑of‑plea hearing Dominguez entered guilty pleas after a full Rule 11 colloquy in which he affirmed understanding and satisfaction with counsel; the First Step Act (which narrowed § 924(c) stacking) was enacted the same day.
Dominguez moved to withdraw his plea, arguing (1) his plea was not knowingly/intelligently made because he misunderstood his sentencing alternatives after the First Step Act, and (2) counsel failed to provide the required "close assistance" (ineffective assistance) by not accounting for the Act.
The district court denied withdrawal, finding the Rule 11 colloquy dispositive as to knowledge and that counsel’s failure to anticipate legislation was not a lack of close assistance; the Tenth Circuit affirmed.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether plea was knowing and intelligent	Dominguez: plea uninformed because he misunderstood post‑First Step Act sentencing exposure for charges dismissed in the plea, so he lacked full understanding of alternatives	Government: Rule 11 colloquy accurately advised direct consequences of the guilty pleas; penalties on dismissed counts are collateral and not required for plea validity	Affirmed — plea was knowing/intelligent; Rule 11 colloquy and direct‑consequences rule control
Whether defendant received “close assistance” of counsel (ineffective assistance)	Dominguez: counsel failed to research/advise regarding imminent First Step Act change; had he known, he would have rejected the plea or obtained a better deal	Government: counsel advised under then‑existing law; any failure to anticipate pending legislation is not constitutionally prejudicial; plea was objectively rational given evidence and benefits of the plea	Affirmed — no Strickland prejudice shown (no reasonable probability result would differ); counsel’s performance did not void plea

Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614 (1998) (guilty plea must be intelligent to be constitutionally valid)
Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (1985) (Strickland standard applied to guilty‑plea prejudice: must show would have gone to trial)
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (two‑pronged ineffective‑assistance test: performance and prejudice)
Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010) (prejudice inquiry includes whether rejecting plea would have been rational)
United States v. Guerra, 94 F.3d 989 (5th Cir. 1996) (distinguishable: district court misstated maximum penalty, rendering plea unintelligent)
United States v. Yazzie, 407 F.3d 1139 (10th Cir. 2005) (factors for assessing pre‑sentence plea withdrawal motions)
Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63 (1977) (solemn in‑court statements during plea colloquy carry a strong presumption of verity)