United States v. Doka, 955 F.3d 290

Doka pleaded guilty (2015) under a cooperation agreement and was sentenced in 2017 to time served plus three years supervised release.
Probation filed a petition alleging three supervised-release violations (May–Oct 2017): second-degree assault, third-degree criminal possession of a controlled substance, and controlled-substance use.
After an evidentiary hearing, the District Court found all three violations by a preponderance of the evidence, revoked supervised release, and sentenced Doka to 48 months’ imprisonment followed by ten years’ supervised release.
On appeal Doka challenged (inter alia) the constitutionality of judicial factfinding under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3), arguing Haymond v. United States undermined Circuit precedent requiring only judge-found facts by a preponderance.
The Second Circuit considered whether Haymond (which invalidated § 3583(k)) extended to § 3583(e)(3) and whether judicial factfinding in revocation proceedings remains constitutional.
The Court affirmed, holding § 3583(e)(3) remains constitutional and Haymond is limited to § 3583(k).

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether judicial factfinding under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3) is constitutional after Haymond	The United States: § 3583(e)(3) is constitutional; longstanding Circuit precedent permits judge-found facts by a preponderance in revocation proceedings.	Doka: Haymond undermines precedent and requires jury findings beyond a reasonable doubt for facts that increase post-revocation punishment.	Affirmed: § 3583(e)(3) constitutional; judge may find violations by a preponderance; revocation did not violate Fifth or Sixth Amendments.
Whether Haymond’s holding extends beyond § 3583(k) to general revocations under § 3583(e)(3)	U.S.: Haymond was limited to the unusual features of § 3583(k) and does not control § 3583(e)(3).	Doka: Haymond’s reasoning should apply broadly to supervised-release revocations.	Affirmed: Haymond is limited to § 3583(k); § 3583(e)(3) lacks the three problematic features identified in Haymond (discrete offense list, removal of judicial discretion, mandatory minimum).

United States v. Haymond, 139 S. Ct. 2369 (2019) (plurality and controlling concurrence invalidating § 3583(k) and explaining limits on judge-found facts that trigger mandatory minimums)
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000) (fact increasing prescribed sentence must be proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt)
Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99 (2013) (facts that increase mandatory minimums must be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt)
Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188 (1977) (method for determining controlling opinion when no single rationale commands a majority)
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972) (revocation proceedings are not full criminal prosecutions and afford limited procedural protections)
United States v. Carthen, 681 F.3d 94 (2d Cir. 2012) (revocation standard: preponderance of the evidence suffices)
United States v. McNeil, 415 F.3d 273 (2d Cir. 2005) (supervised-release violation need only be proven by a preponderance)
United States v. Meeks, 25 F.3d 1117 (2d Cir. 1994) (revocation consequences are part of original sentence)
United States v. Watters, 947 F.3d 493 (8th Cir. 2020) (treating Justice Breyer’s Haymond concurrence as the controlling, narrower ground)