United States v. Dmytro Patiutka
2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 18464
| 4th Cir. | 2015Background
- On April 27, 2013 Trooper Cox stopped an SUV driven by Dmytro Patiutka for possible tint and lane violations; Patiutka produced a Lithuanian license bearing the name “Roman Pak.”
- Trooper Cox asked Patiutka his name and birthdate; Cox later testified the birth year given differed by eight years from the license, causing Cox to suspect Patiutka lied about his identity.
- Cox ran checks, returned the license, issued warnings, told Patiutka he was free to go, then asked for consent to search; Cox believed he obtained consent and signaled other officers to search.
- Officers uncovered a credit card reader and four new iPads; when Patiutka revoked consent and asked them to stop, Trooper Moore nevertheless placed him in investigative detention, handcuffed him, and the search continued, producing blank credit cards, an embosser, and a re-encoder.
- Patiutka was later transported, Mirandized, and made incriminating statements; he was ultimately federally charged with access device fraud and aggravated identity theft and moved to suppress the physical evidence and derivative statements.
- The district court granted suppression; the government appealed claiming the search was justified as incident to arrest or under the automobile exception. The Fourth Circuit affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the warrantless search was valid as search incident to arrest | Patiutka: officers lacked probable cause to arrest when consent was revoked; search unlawful | Gov’t: officers had probable cause to arrest for providing false identity, so search incident to arrest | Held: No — district court’s credibility findings show no probable cause at time consent was revoked; incident-to-arrest exception inapplicable |
| Whether the search was valid under the automobile exception | Patiutka: facts known when search continued did not establish probable cause to search the vehicle | Gov’t: presence of iPads and a card reader (plus Cox’s suspicions) gave probable cause | Held: No — the discovered items had innocent explanations and did not supply probable cause; automobile exception does not apply |
| Whether collective-knowledge doctrine cures lack of probable cause | Patiutka: Cox lacked probable cause to begin with, so nothing to impute | Gov’t: Cox’s suspicions should be imputed to Moore, tipping the scales to probable cause | Held: No — doctrine cannot be used to aggregate disparate facts; instructing officer (Cox) lacked probable cause, so collective knowledge does not help |
| Whether officers could rely on reasonable articulable suspicion rather than probable cause to continue search | Patiutka: RAS is insufficient to justify warrantless automobile search | Gov’t: troopers at least had RAS based on items observed | Held: RAS alone insufficient; probable cause required under automobile exception and was absent |
Key Cases Cited
- Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433 (1973) (warrantless searches are presumptively unreasonable except in established exceptions)
- Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332 (2009) (limits on vehicle searches incident to arrest)
- Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98 (1980) (search may begin prior to arrest but officers must have probable cause before starting search incident to arrest)
- United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982) (automobile exception: warrantless vehicle searches permitted when probable cause exists)
- Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690 (1996) (probable cause evaluated by objective standards and practical considerations)
- Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949) (probable cause deals in practical probabilities, not technicalities)
- Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948) (prohibits justifying an arrest by the results of a warrantless search that produced the evidence for the arrest)
- United States v. Massenburg, 654 F.3d 480 (4th Cir. 2011) (collective-knowledge doctrine cannot be used to aggregate bits of information from multiple officers; the instructing officer must have sufficient information)