United States v. Dixon, 4:11-cr-00350

James Dixon was convicted after a bench trial of aiding and abetting an assault on a federal correctional officer (18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 111(a),(b)) and sentenced to 120 months on August 28, 2013; the Third Circuit affirmed on appeal.
Dixon filed a timely pro se § 2255 motion claiming ineffective assistance of counsel in three respects: (1) failure to move to dismiss under the Speedy Trial Act; (2) failure to interview/call two potential defense witnesses (Angelo and Johnson); and (3) failure to object to the court’s definition of “bodily injury” and allegedly misleading advice about that definition affecting his plea decision.
Trial counsel had requested multiple continuances (recorded in the docket) for preparation and plea negotiation reasons; the court excluded those delays under the Speedy Trial Act’s "ends of justice" provisions.
Trial counsel investigated Angelo and Johnson, secured their availability, but chose not to call them; video evidence of the altercation was admitted and clearly depicted Dixon’s role.
Counsel communicated with Dixon in letters about sentencing exposure, explicitly warning that the § 111(b) “bodily injury” definition could be read broadly and recommending acceptance of the plea; counsel also provided Guideline-related sentencing information tied to the plea.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Speedy Trial Act dismissal	Dixon: counsel ineffective for not moving to dismiss where trial began >70 days after first appearance	Government/Court: delays were properly excluded by multiple "ends of justice" continuances requested for preparation and plea negotiations	Denied — counsel not ineffective because a Speedy Trial motion would have been meritless; continuances properly excluded time
Failure to interview/call witnesses	Dixon: Angelo and Johnson would have testified Dixon did not punch/kick officer; counsel failed to interview/call them	Counsel: witnesses were located/secured but strategically not called; video evidence plainly showed the assault	Denied — investigation was reasonable; even if counsel erred, no prejudice because video evidence was duplicative and outcome wouldn’t differ
Failure to object to definition of "bodily injury" / misleading advice on plea	Dixon: counsel should have objected to court using Title 18 definitions and misled Dixon about "bodily injury," causing him to reject a plea	Counsel: Title 18 definitions apply and any objection would be meritless; counsel warned Dixon that § 111(b) could be read broadly and advised plea acceptance	Denied — objection would be meritless; counsel adequately informed Dixon of sentencing exposure and did not misleadingly deprive him of an informed plea decision

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (establishes two-prong ineffective-assistance test)
Booth v. United States, 432 F.3d 542 (courts accept truth of § 2255 allegations unless clearly frivolous)
Tolliver v. United States, 800 F.3d 138 (§ 2255 requires hearing when factual disputes not resolved by record)
United States v. Sanders, 165 F.3d 248 (counsel need not raise meritless claims)
United States v. Fields, 39 F.3d 439 ("ends of justice" continuances may be granted to permit plea negotiations)
Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (ineffective assistance context for plea decisions)
United States v. Day, 969 F.2d 39 (defendant must be accurately informed of comparative sentence exposure to make an intelligent plea decision)
United States v. Lilly, 536 F.3d 190 (district court need not address both Strickland prongs if one is dispositive)