United States v. Dion Thomas
760 F.3d 879
| 8th Cir. | 2014Background
- Dion Thomas, a Chicago resident, traveled to Waterloo, Iowa, and supplied both heroin and crack to relatives and redistributors; law enforcement intercepted calls and conducted a controlled buy of 0.54 g of heroin.
- A federal grand jury charged Thomas with conspiracy to distribute ≥100 g of heroin and one count of distribution of 0.54 g heroin; a jury convicted him on both counts.
- Presentence Report (PSR) attributed large quantities of both heroin and crack to Thomas; converted drug amounts produced a Guidelines base offense level increased by the crack-equivalent amount.
- The district court denied several pretrial and midtrial defense motions (including motions for new counsel), admitted testimony about crack distribution and limited rebuttal testimony about suspected casino money laundering, and overruled PSR objections.
- The court imposed concurrent 240-month sentences (below the Guidelines range) and eight years supervised release; Thomas appealed challenging evidentiary rulings, counsel substitution denials, offense-level calculation based on uncharged crack conduct, and inclusion of a prior Illinois cocaine conviction in criminal-history computation.
Issues
| Issue | Thomas's Argument | Government's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Admissibility of crack-distribution evidence under Fed. R. Evid. 404(b) | Crack evidence was prior-bad-acts, dissimilar, prejudicial, and not part of the heroin conspiracy | Evidence was intrinsic/res gestae: intertwined with heroin distribution and provided context | Admitted as intrinsic evidence; no abuse of discretion |
| Admissibility of casino/money-laundering rebuttal testimony | Testimony about suspected money laundering was irrelevant and unfairly prejudicial | Testimony rebutted alibi, linked Player's Club card to Thomas, and explained absence of June video | Admissible as relevant, probative rebuttal and intrinsic context; not unfairly prejudicial |
| Motion(s) for substitute appointed counsel | Denied new counsel due to lack of specific examples of inadequate representation and poor communication | Magistrate and counsel testified adequate communication and representation occurred; no irreconcilable conflict shown | Denial affirmed; defendant failed to show justifiable dissatisfaction |
| Use of uncharged crack conduct and prior state cocaine conviction in sentencing | Using uncharged crack conduct to raise Guidelines level and counting prior Illinois conviction violated Fifth, Sixth, and Due Process rights | District court may consider judge-found relevant conduct for advisory Guidelines; prior state conviction is a separate prior sentence for criminal-history if not part of instant offense | Court upheld use of crack as relevant conduct for Guidelines (judge-found by preponderance) and rejected Alleyne challenge; prior Illinois conviction properly counted as a separate prior sentence |
Key Cases Cited
- Katz v. United States, 445 F.3d 1023 (8th Cir.) (standard of review and admissibility under Rule 404(b))
- Johnson v. United States, 463 F.3d 803 (8th Cir.) (intrinsic vs. extrinsic evidence / "completes the story")
- Fleck v. United States, 413 F.3d 883 (8th Cir.) (evidence admissible when "so blended or connected" as to explain circumstances)
- Baisden v. United States, 713 F.3d 450 (8th Cir.) (standards for substitute counsel; justifiable dissatisfaction inquiry)
- Ault v. United States, 446 F.3d 821 (8th Cir.) (drug-quantity relevant conduct may include uncharged types and acts in same course of conduct)
- Booker v. United States, 543 U.S. 220 (U.S.) (advisory Guidelines and permissibility of judicial factfinding at sentencing)
- Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151 (U.S.) (mandatory-minimum increasing facts are elements; court limited its holding re: judicial factfinding for advisory Guidelines)
- Hernandez v. United States, 712 F.3d 407 (8th Cir.) (distinguishing relevant-conduct considered for base offense level from prior sentences in criminal-history computation)
- Whiting v. United States, 522 F.3d 845 (8th Cir.) (court may consider charged, uncharged, dismissed, and acquitted conduct as relevant conduct)
- Pepper v. United States, 747 F.3d 520 (8th Cir.) (factors for determining whether a prior conviction is part of the instant offense for criminal-history purposes)