37 F.4th 31
1st Cir.2022Background:
- In April 2016 Dion was arrested in Maine for aggravated assault involving his long-term girlfriend, T.N.; a state judge imposed a conditional release (bail) order containing no-contact and stay-away provisions.
- The printed bail form showed the no-contact box unchecked, but Dion signed a bail-bond agreement and was told orally of the no-contact/stay-away conditions.
- The state assault charge was later dismissed after T.N.'s death; three years later a federal grand jury indicted Dion under 18 U.S.C. § 2262(a)(1) for interstate travel with intent to violate a "protection order."
- Dion moved to dismiss, arguing (1) the conditional-release no-contact/stay-away provisions are not "protection orders" under 18 U.S.C. § 2266(5), and (2) the indictment violated his due process right to notice.
- The district court denied the motion; Dion entered a conditional guilty plea preserving appeal rights and was sentenced; the First Circuit affirmed.
Issues:
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a conditional-release no-contact/stay-away order qualifies as a "protection order" under 18 U.S.C. § 2266(5) | Gov: yes — the statutory definition (including the catch-all) covers such orders | Dion: no — conditional release orders are not the kind of protection orders Congress meant to reach | Yes. The court held such provisions can be "protection orders" when statutory conditions are met |
| Whether the "so long as" clause limits the catch-all category in §2266(5)(A) | Gov: the clause does not narrow the catch-all (or applies only to illustrative examples) | Dion: the clause limits the catch-all; his order does not meet it | The court read the "so long as" clause as applying to the catch-all and gave it operative effect |
| Meaning of "by or on behalf of a person seeking protection" — does a prosecutor's motion satisfy "on behalf of"? | Gov: yes — "on behalf of" includes actions taken in the interest of or for the benefit of the victim, so a prosecutor's request qualifies | Dion: no — prosecutor represents the state, not the victim, so it cannot be "on behalf of" the victim | "On behalf of" means "in the interest of/for the benefit of" a person seeking protection; prosecutor's request satisfied the clause |
| Due process / notice — did Dion lack constitutionally adequate notice of potential federal prosecution? | Gov: statute and definition give sufficient notice that interstate travel to violate a protection order can be federally prosecuted | Dion: he lacked actual notice that violating the No-Contact Order could lead to federal charges | Rejected. The statute's plain language furnished adequate notice; no personalized/explicit federal warning was required |
Key Cases Cited
- Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687 (1995) (treating expressly defined statutory terms as controlling for interpretation)
- United States v. Cline, 986 F.3d 873 (5th Cir. 2021) (interpreting §2266 catch-all and illustrative language; discussed and distinguished)
- United States v. Merced-García, 24 F.4th 76 (1st Cir. 2022) (addressing prejudice from defects in written plea/agreements)
- United States v. Musso, 914 F.3d 26 (1st Cir. 2019) (pretrial motion may be resolved where government does not dispute pertinent facts)
- United States v. Arcadipane, 41 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1994) (statutory plain language can provide constitutionally sufficient notice)
- Voisine v. United States, 579 U.S. 686 (2016) (inferring congressional intent from state-law background when construing federal domestic-violence provisions)