United States v. Dilworth, 2:02-cr-00044

Columbus Malone was convicted in 2003 of conspiracy to distribute crack cocaine under 21 U.S.C. § 846 and distribution under § 841(a)(1).
He received a 235-month sentence, which the Seventh Circuit ultimately affirmed in 2009 after remands for resentencing.
Malone filed a second § 2255 motion alleging ineffective assistance of counsel at sentencing and on appeal, and an excessive sentence.
The court analyzes whether § 2255 relief is available and whether counsel’s performance was deficient and prejudicial under Strickland.
The court notes the base offense level and sentence were within the applicable guidelines and statutory maxima.
The court ultimately denies the § 2255 petition as meritless.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Ineffective assistance at sentencing/appeal	Malone contends counsel failed to object to drug quantity and disparity issues.	Malone's counsel acted strategically; objections would have been futile given guidelines and case law.	No effective-assistance deficiency shown; no prejudice.
Drug quantity and relevant conduct as base	Disputed the PSR quantities attributed to him for which he was held accountable.	PSR findings were well-supported and Malone failed to create real doubt.	Counsel’s strategy reasonable; no error in quantity finding.
Disparity between crack and powder cocaine	Argues for downward variance due to sentencing disparity.	Disparity arguments were futile given caselaw upholding the ratio and amendments.	No prejudice; trial court did not err in declining to raise disparity argument.
Reasonableness of sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)	Sentence excessive compared to similar powder cocaine cases.	Sentence fell within advisory range and was at the bottom of that range.	Sentence was reasonable and within the guideline range.

Reed v. Farley, 512 U.S. 339 (1994) (§ 2255 claims require cause and prejudice unless ineffective assistance)
Frady v. United States, 456 U.S. 152 (1982) (procedural default and collateral attack standards)
Fountain v. United States, 211 F.3d 429 (7th Cir. 2000) (counsel's errors must be raised promptly on direct appeal when possible)
Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500 (2003) (ineffective-assistance claims may be brought in § 2255 proceedings)
Richardson v. United States, 379 F.3d 485 (7th Cir. 2004) (ineffective assistance standard and prejudice analysis in the Seventh Circuit)
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (establishes deficient performance and prejudice standard)
United States v. Castro-Juarez, 425 F.3d 430 (7th Cir. 2005) (guideline-based presumptions on reasonableness of sentences)
United States v. Padilla, 520 F.3d 766 (7th Cir. 2008) (amendments reducing crack/powder disparity and impact on calculations)
United States v. Heckel, 570 F.3d 791 (7th Cir. 2009) (district court may rely on a presentence report if reliable)
United States v. Corbitt, 879 F.2d 224 (7th Cir. 1989) (standards for challenging PSR factual accuracy)
United States v. Westbrook, 125 F.3d 996 (7th Cir. 1997) (crack/powder sentencing ratio upheld against challenges)
Lucas v. O’Dea, 179 F.3d 412 (6th Cir. 1999) (rare cases where counsel's failure to object not prejudicial)