United States v. Dillard
989 F. Supp. 2d 1169
D. Kan.2013Background
- Angel Dillard sent a letter to Dr. Mila Means protesting Means’ announced plan to open an abortion clinic; the letter included the line: “You will be checking under your car everyday — because maybe today is the day someone places an explosive under it.”
- The United States sued Dillard under the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act (FACE), alleging the letter constituted a true threat; the court previously denied a motion to dismiss to allow discovery.
- Discovery and testimony established: Dillard denied any intent to threaten or to engage in violence; FBI and Wichita police found no direct threat; Dillard corresponded with anti-abortion circles but there was no evidence she advocated violence.
- Dr. Means testified she felt threatened, took security precautions, but conceded she had no evidence of Dillard’s propensity for violence and learned of no ongoing plot; Means later abandoned plans to open the clinic for state-law and other reasons.
- The government could not produce evidence linking Dillard to any violent plot, showing imminence, or showing Dillard’s personal participation in prospective violence; much proffered evidence was hearsay, speculative, or inadmissible.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Dillard’s letter is a "true threat" under FACE | Letter intentionally intimidated Means; language about a car bomb can be read as a threat | Letter was predictive/conditional, aimed to dissuade; Dillard lacked intent to threaten | Not a true threat as a matter of law — summary judgment for Dillard |
| Role of speaker’s subjective intent in true-threat analysis | Government: FACE liability requires showing Dillard intended to intimidate | Dillard: no subjective intent to inflict harm or threaten | Court: subjective intent is relevant but government failed to produce admissible evidence; analysis focused on objective factors |
| Whether a true threat must be imminent and unconditional | Government implied future threats can suffice | Dillard: language was conditional, speculative, non-imminent | Court: imminence/likelihood and unconditional tenor are required; letter was conditional and non-imminent |
| Whether the communication must show sender’s participation or ability to carry out violence | Government: letter invoked violent acts and Tiller’s murder — supports inference Dillard could incite or participate | Dillard: letter predicts others’ actions and makes no claim she or her associates will act | Court: communication must reasonably suggest sender’s own intent/participation; no such link here |
| Whether permanent injunction is warranted | Government sought injunction to prevent future contacts/threats | Dillard argued injunction unnecessary because Means abandoned clinic and no ongoing threat exists | Court: injunctive relief denied as moot; no evidentiary basis for prospective relief |
Key Cases Cited
- Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003) (explains true-threat doctrine and state interest in preventing fear of violence)
- United States v. Viefhaus, 168 F.3d 392 (10th Cir. 1999) (true threats when specific, imminent bombs and sender linked to plot)
- United States v. Lincoln, 403 F.3d 703 (9th Cir. 2005) (single crude letter to President not a true threat absent evidence linking sender to execution)
- United States v. Bagdasarian, 652 F.3d 1113 (9th Cir. 2011) (threatening language predicting third-party violence insufficient where speaker does not claim personal intent)
- Nielander v. Board of County Com’rs, 582 F.3d 1155 (10th Cir. 2009) (true threat requires gravity of purpose and likelihood of execution)
- United States v. Magleby, 420 F.3d 1136 (10th Cir. 2005) (threats unprotected when communicating speaker’s intent to commit violence)
- Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705 (1969) (equivocal or conditional political hyperbole may be protected speech)