United States v. Diaz-Rosado, 857 F.3d 116

Background

On March 8, 2013, Diaz forcibly seized a car from Margarita Irizarry-Ramirez while her four-year-old granddaughter was in a car seat; a bystander (Vázquez) intervened and later gave chase and called 911.
Police arrested Diaz shortly thereafter; Irizarry and Vázquez failed to identify him in a lineup/photo array shortly after the incident, though Vázquez later identified Diaz in-court after defense counsel’s questioning.
At the station Diaz was read Miranda warnings, signed a form, and wrote a short statement admitting taking the keys while "under the influence of substances." The Puerto Rico D.A. declined local charges citing concerns about voluntariness; federal prosecutors charged Diaz under 18 U.S.C. § 2119 (carjacking).
Diaz moved to suppress the written statement arguing it was involuntary due to intoxication; the district court held the statement was not the product of coercive police interrogation and admitted it. Videos and testimony about Diaz’s mental state were considered but found not to show coercion.
The jury was instructed on assessing the confession’s weight; asked whether the Puerto Rico Millán Pacheco standard applied, the judge told jurors the confession had been admitted and they should weigh it like other evidence; Diaz requested a supplemental instruction that jurors could disregard the confession entirely but the court declined.
The jury convicted Diaz of carjacking; he appealed challenging sufficiency of intent, admission of the confession, the jury instruction, and Vázquez’s in‑court identification. The First Circuit affirmed.

Issues

Issue	Diaz's Argument	Government's Argument	Held
Sufficiency of intent under § 2119	Evidence insufficient because no weapon, no explicit threats, and therefore no specific intent to cause serious harm	Violence used (pushing, slamming, moving car with child inside) and escalation show conditional intent to cause serious harm if necessary	Affirmed: evidence sufficient when viewed in favor of the verdict; force and escalation support conditional intent
Admissibility of written confession	Confession involuntary because Diaz was intoxicated/mentally impaired and in police custody; government failed to prove voluntariness	Confession was a volunteered statement after Miranda warnings; no evidence of custodial interrogation or coercive police activity	Affirmed: no coercive police conduct shown; voluntariness issue for admissibility resolved for judge, weight for jury
Jury instruction about confession	Judge should have told jury they may give the confession no weight at all and apply Millán Pacheco standard	Judge already instructed jury to treat confession like other evidence and decide how much weight to give it	Affirmed: requested language was substantially incorporated; no abuse of discretion in repeating prior instruction
In‑court identification by Vázquez	Identification tainted/should be struck	Identification elicited by defense counsel; no objection at trial; testimony was responsive to defense questioning	Affirmed: defendant solicited the identification; cannot complain about testimony responsive to defense questions

Key Cases Cited

Holloway v. United States, 526 U.S. 1 (1999) (§ 2119 satisfied by conditional intent to cause serious harm if necessary)
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (Miranda warnings and custodial interrogation rules)
Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980) (interrogation includes conduct likely to elicit incriminating response)
Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157 (1986) (voluntariness requires coercive police activity)
United States v. Flores-Rivera, 787 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2015) (standard for factual summaries on appeal)
United States v. Peña, 586 F.3d 105 (1st Cir. 2009) (de novo review of preserved sufficiency challenges)
United States v. Ortiz, 966 F.2d 707 (1st Cir. 1992) (reviewer’s deference to plausible renditions of record supporting verdict)
United States v. Rodríguez-Adorno, 695 F.3d 32 (1st Cir. 2012) (use of early violence indicates willingness to harm under § 2119)
United States v. Cruz-Feliciano, 786 F.3d 78 (1st Cir. 2015) (defendant cannot complain about testimony responsive to defense counsel)
United States v. Feliz, 794 F.3d 123 (1st Cir. 2015) (jury may consider confessor’s impairment in weighing confession)