United States v. Diaz-Rodriguez, 15-1307P

Background

On Sept. 1, 2010, Díaz participated in an armed robbery of an armored truck in Morovis, Puerto Rico; multiple robbers carried firearms, shots were fired, victims were wounded, and the robbers fled and were later arrested.
A superseding indictment charged Díaz with (1) Hobbs Act robbery, 18 U.S.C. § 1951, and (2) carrying and using a firearm discharged during and in relation to the robbery, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), with § 2 aiding-and-abetting language cited.
Díaz signed a plea agreement admitting guilt to both counts (including that he aided and abetted others who carried and used a discharged firearm); the agreement specified sentencing terms and contained an appeal waiver.
At the Rule 11 change-of-plea colloquy Díaz agreed with the government’s factual proffer: he was in a vehicle with armed confederates, brandished a gun, restrained a victim in a bear-hug while confederates fired (one shot Díaz and a victim), and he remained with the group and fled.
The district court accepted the plea and, relying on offense level 28 and criminal history III, sentenced Díaz to 120 months for Count One and 120 months consecutive for Count Two. Díaz did not move to withdraw his plea and now appeals, arguing insufficient factual basis for the § 924(c) aiding-and-abetting intent element post-Rosemond.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether plea acceptance on Count Two lacked a factual basis for the § 2 intent element after Rosemond	Gov’t: record and Díaz’s admissions supply a rational factual basis showing advance knowledge or knowledge permitting withdrawal	Díaz: no sufficient evidence he had advance knowledge that confederates would carry or discharge firearms, so plea lacked factual basis	Affirmed. Court found Díaz’s admissions and the government’s proffer provided a rational basis; even if he lacked prior knowledge, shots fired during the robbery gave him opportunities to withdraw but he remained.
Whether appeal waiver bars this appeal	Gov’t: waiver bars appeal because sentence conformed to plea agreement	Díaz: challenge to Guidelines calculation/factual-basis claim falls outside waiver	Court assumed waiver inapplicable for argument’s sake and decided on the merits; no reversible error.
Whether indictment or plea notice defective for aiding-and-abetting charge	Gov’t: citing § 2 in indictment and plea agreement sufficed; no unfair surprise	Díaz: Count Two lacked explicit "aiding and abetting" language; insufficient notice	Rejected. Indictment cited § 2; plea agreement and colloquy made clear he pled to aiding-and-abetting.
Whether district court erred by not granting age/medical downward departure or failing to consider § 3553(a) factors	Díaz: court ignored age and physical injuries, should have departed under §5H1.4	Gov’t: court considered these factors and declined departure within discretion	Rejected. Record shows court considered age and medical condition and recognized authority to depart but declined.

Key Cases Cited

United States v. Ramos-Mejía, 721 F.3d 12 (1st Cir.) (Rule 11 factual-basis standard; modest showing required)
United States v. Pimentel, 539 F.3d 26 (1st Cir.) (government need only show rational basis for guilt)
United States v. Delgado-Hernández, 420 F.3d 16 (1st Cir.) (Rule 11 factual-basis principles)
United States v. Jiminez, 498 F.3d 82 (1st Cir.) (sufficient factual basis may derive from defendant’s admissions or government’s proffer)
Rosemond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1240 (2014) (aider/abettor must have advance knowledge that a confederate would use or carry a gun to satisfy § 924(c) intent requirement)
United States v. Laracuent, 778 F.3d 347 (1st Cir.) (defendant’s admissions of knowing possession of firearms undermine claims of lack of advance knowledge)
United States v. Sanchez, 917 F.2d 607 (1st Cir.) (aiding-and-abetting is an alternative charge; citing § 2 is sufficient absent unfair surprise)
United States v. Teeter, 257 F.3d 14 (1st Cir.) (plea agreement and colloquy inform knowledge and volition in plea bargains)
United States v. Rossignol, 780 F.3d 475 (1st Cir.) (district court’s weighing of § 3553(a) factors is reviewed for reasonableness)
United States v. LeBlanc, 24 F.3d 340 (1st Cir.) (refusal to depart downward is generally not appealable absent a legal mistake about authority)
United States v. Hilton, 946 F.2d 955 (1st Cir.) (departure review principles)
United States v. Ríos-Hernández, 645 F.3d 456 (1st Cir.) (gathering facts from plea colloquy in guilty-plea appeals)