United States v. Diaz
670 F.3d 332
| 1st Cir. | 2012Background
- Indictment charged a drug conspiracy and related counts at Carioca, a public housing project in Guayama, Puerto Rico, within 1,000 feet of protected areas (school, playground, or housing).
- Convictions: Díaz convicted on Counts 1–5; Rodríguez-Romero and Rodríguez convicted on Counts 1–5; López-Capó convicted on Counts 1 and 3; Rodríguez acquitted on Count 6 and others are not at issue here.
- Rodríguez lacked an Attorney General certification under the Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act (FJDA); proceedings began before he turned 21 and he was juvenile for much of the conspiracy, raising jurisdictional concerns over certain substantive counts.
- Evidence included three cooperating witnesses, police testimony, and a chemist; Carioca operated inside the housing project and is a public housing facility; the district court’s 1,000-foot finding and use of “within 1,000 feet” language are central to the schoolyard counts.
- On appeal, the First Circuit vacated Rodríguez’s convictions on Counts 2 and 4 and remanded for a new sentencing hearing, while affirming the other convictions and upholding evidentiary rulings and instructions in Díaz, Rodríguez-Romero, and López-Capó.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the government proved the 1,000-foot proximity to a protected area | Díaz and López-Capó argued insufficient proof of 1,000-foot proximity | Díaz and López-Capó contended distances were not properly proven | Evidence sufficient; proximity established through common-sense distance/timeline analysis |
| Rodríguez’s jurisdiction under the FJDA for post-majority conduct | Government asserted post-majority acts supported conspiracy after 18; counts lacked post-majority evidence | Rodríguez argued lack of post-majority evidence and improper consideration | Conspiracy count valid; substantive counts lacking post-majority jurisdiction; Counts 2 and 4 vacated and remanded for resentencing |
| Impeachment and hearsay rulings affecting Rodríguez-Romero | Defendant claimed impeachment witness Colón-Pérez and hearsay statements violated rights | Discretionary evidentiary rulings insufficient to prejudice defense | No reversible error; rulings within discretion; Confrontation Clause concerns not triggered on record |
| Multiple conspiracy instruction and sentencing challenges (López-Capó) | Claimed need for multiple conspiracy instruction; claimed errors in sentencing enhancements and CHC | Argued lack of instruction and misapplied guidelines | No abuse of discretion; no reversible error; sentence affirmed except Rodríguez’s Counts 2 and 4 vacated and remanded as noted |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Soler, 275 F.3d 146 (1st Cir. 2002) (distance proof for 'within 1,000 feet' requires precision, but common sense applies when gap small)
- Vargas-De Jesús v. United States, 618 F.3d 59 (1st Cir. 2010) (FJDA certification and post-majority conduct govern jurisdiction over conspiracy vs. substantive counts)
- Welch v. United States, 15 F.3d 1202 (1st Cir. 1993) (jurisdictional issues tied to conspiracy vs. substantive offenses; premajority evidence permissible with ratification requirement)
- Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640 (1946) (vicarious liability for co-conspirators’ offenses if reasonably foreseeable and in furtherance of the conspiracy)
- United States v. Pelletier, 845 F.2d 1126 (1st Cir. 1988) (co-conspirator statements admissible if corroborated and in furtherance of conspiracy)