United States v. Dexter Jackson, 703 F. App'x 853

Jackson pleaded guilty in 2013 to conspiracy to commit bank fraud; after release he served a five-year term of supervised release with a condition prohibiting new crimes.
In May 2016 a probation officer filed a violation petition alleging child molestation (O.C.G.A. § 16-6-4), enticing a child for indecent purposes (O.C.G.A. § 16-6-5), criminal trespass, loitering/prowling, missed restitution, and multiple positive marijuana tests; Jackson admitted the drug and trespass/loitering violations but disputed the child-sexual-offense allegations.
The sole contested evidence at the revocation hearing was the eight-year-old victim’s recorded forensic interview (conducted by Mindy Paylor), in which the child said Jackson kissed her on the lips on three occasions after picking her up from school and on the third occasion put his tongue in her mouth.
Other testimony (the child’s mother, the probation officer, and defense witnesses) provided corroborating background (locations, Jackson’s use of the black Dodge vehicle) and challenged feasibility/consistency; defense presented character witnesses and an investigator demonstrating difficulty reaching the back seat from the front.
The district court—applying the preponderance standard—found the child credible, concluded Jackson committed child molestation and enticement, revoked supervised release, and imposed a 12‑month sentence followed by 18 months’ supervised release; Jackson appealed.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the government proved by a preponderance that Jackson committed child molestation and enticement	Gov’t: The child’s recorded interview, corroborated by the mother’s report and other hearing testimony, makes it more likely than not Jackson kissed the child and placed his tongue in her mouth	Jackson: The child’s statements were inconsistent, delayed, uncorroborated in material respects, and physically implausible given vehicle geometry and his size	Affirmed: Court held the district court did not clearly err in crediting the child’s detailed, largely consistent statements and revoked release
Whether the district court’s credibility determination was reversible	Gov’t: Credibility findings are for the factfinder and need only satisfy preponderance; small inconsistencies are permissible	Jackson: The inconsistencies and implausibilities render the finding facially improbable and therefore clearly erroneous	Affirmed: Appellate court deferred to district court, finding no credibility determination contrary to law of nature or so improbable that no reasonable factfinder could accept it

United States v. Sweeting, 437 F.3d 1105 (11th Cir. 2006) (preponderance standard for revocation)
United States v. Cataldo, 171 F.3d 1316 (11th Cir. 1999) (discussion of preponderance standard)
United States v. Frazier, 26 F.3d 110 (11th Cir. 1994) (standard of review—abuse of discretion—for revocation)
United States v. Almand, 992 F.2d 316 (11th Cir. 1993) (district court factual findings reviewed for clear error)
United States v. Ramirez-Chilel, 289 F.3d 744 (11th Cir. 2002) (credibility findings will not be overturned unless contrary to laws of nature or facially improbable)
United States v. Rodriguez, 398 F.3d 1291 (11th Cir. 2005) (deference to factfinder’s credibility-based findings)
United States v. McPhee, 336 F.3d 1269 (11th Cir. 2003) (substantial deference where two permissible views of evidence exist)
Snowden v. Singletary, 135 F.3d 732 (11th Cir. 1998) (expert testimony bolstering child-victim credibility improper)