United States v. Devon Hunt
2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 22591
| D.C. Cir. | 2016Background
- Devon Hunt pleaded guilty under a Rule 11(c)(1)(C) plea agreement to conspiracy to distribute 100+ grams of heroin; parties stipulated to 60–65 months imprisonment and five years supervised release.
- The plea agreement included an anticipatory appellate-waiver clause covering appeals of the sentence, including “term of supervised release” and the court’s “authority . . . to set conditions of release,” with limited exceptions.
- At the plea colloquy the district court orally described the waiver inconsistently (once allowing appeal of an “illegal” sentence), and the government did not clarify those inconsistencies.
- At sentencing the government requested a supervised-release condition barring Hunt from entering the Potomac Gardens housing complex (bounded by specified streets); defense counsel objected to the geographic exclusion but not to the district court’s failure to explain the condition.
- The district court imposed 62 months imprisonment and ordered the stay-away condition (entry forbidden “without prior approval of the U.S. Probation Office”) but made no on-the-record findings explaining the condition.
- Hunt appealed the stay-away condition and the district court’s failure to explain it; the government argued the plea waiver bars the appeal.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Hunt) | Defendant's Argument (Government) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Hunt’s plea waiver bars his appeal of the supervised-release stay-away condition | Waiver is ambiguous as written; colloquy statements permitted Hunt reasonably to believe he could appeal an "illegal" sentence or conditions imposed in violation of law | Waiver clearly covers challenges to sentence and conditions, so appellate claims fall within waived rights | Waiver does not unambiguously bar Hunt’s challenges; ambiguities construed against government, so appeal allowed |
| Whether the district court committed procedural error by failing to explain/substantiate the stay-away condition | Failure to articulate reasons violated §3553(c) and requires reversal or remand | No plain procedural error; any failure was not plain or prejudicial given record | Reviewed for plain error; no plain error—any procedural error was not clear under controlling precedent and did not affect substantial rights |
| Whether the stay-away condition is substantively reasonable under 18 U.S.C. §3583(d) | Condition is overly broad and cannot prevent recidivism elsewhere; unduly restricts liberty in a large area where Hunt has community ties | Condition is tailored to Hunt’s history at Potomac Gardens, aids deterrence and protection, and is limited (approx. 50 acres) with probation-office exception | Condition is substantively reasonable and within district court’s wide discretion; not an abuse of discretion |
| Whether the stay-away condition unduly restricts liberty (necessity and scope) | Geographic restriction is excessive and burdens meaningful associations or residence | Restriction covers a single housing project and small adjacent area (~0.078 sq. miles), with prior-approval carve-out and no showing Hunt lives or has family there | No undue deprivation of liberty; scope is modest, and probation approval provides relief for legitimate needs |
Key Cases Cited
- Ruiz v. United States, 536 U.S. 622 (plea waivers implicate knowing and voluntary nature of plea)
- Hahn v. United States, 359 F.3d 1315 (10th Cir.) (anticipatory appeal waivers generally enforceable)
- United States v. Guillen, 561 F.3d 527 (D.C. Cir.) (knowing, intelligent, voluntary waiver may be enforced)
- United States v. Henry, 758 F.3d 427 (D.C. Cir.) (contract principles govern plea-agreement interpretation; ambiguities construed against drafter)
- In re Sealed Case, 702 F.3d 59 (D.C. Cir.) (ambiguous waiver means no knowing waiver of appeal)
- United States v. Sullivan, 451 F.3d 884 (D.C. Cir.) (failure to substantiate conditions reviewed under plain-error when not contemporaneously objected to)
- Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (sentencing judge has wide discretion and benefits from observing witnesses and weighing facts)