United States v. Devon Golding
833 F.3d 914
| 8th Cir. | 2016Background
- Dr. Devon Northon Golding, an approved Medicare/Medicaid physician, was convicted of three counts of health-care benefits fraud (18 U.S.C. § 1347) and two counts of making false statements about health-care delivery/payment (18 U.S.C. § 1035).
- Nurse Marletta Payne saw patients and billed under Golding’s provider number when Golding was absent; Payne used prescription pads pre-signed by Golding and prepared progress notes Golding later signed.
- At least three claims were reimbursed for visits Payne performed while Golding was out of town; at least two involved controlled-substance prescriptions written on pre-signed pads.
- Pretrial, Golding moved to exclude evidence of a 1998 Board investigation concerning a former physician assistant and a 2011 Board of Pharmacy settlement with Golding’s pharmacy; the district court denied exclusion but gave a limiting instruction that the evidence was for intent/knowledge only.
- The government successfully excluded proposed testimony from Golding’s accountant and limited testimony from an office-sharing physician; the court also sustained a relevance objection to Golding’s sister’s testimony about discovered petty cash.
- Golding appealed, asserting the district court abused its discretion in admitting prior-act evidence under Rule 404(b) and in excluding proposed defense witnesses; the court of appeals affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Golding's Argument | Government's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Admissibility under Rule 404(b) of the 1998 Board investigation and 2011 pharmacy settlement | Prior acts were inadmissible character evidence and unfairly prejudicial | Prior acts were admissible to prove intent/knowledge and not overly remote or unduly prejudicial | Admission not an abuse: relevant to intent/knowledge; limiting instruction mitigated prejudice |
| Remoteness of 1998 investigation | 1989–1991 conduct was too remote to be probative | Prior conduct probative of intent/knowledge despite age | Not overly remote; relevance depends on theory (intent/knowledge) and was reasonable to admit |
| Exclusion of accountant Drysdale’s testimony | Testimony about employee pay/overtime and departures bore on employer practice and bias | Testimony was irrelevant to elements of the charged offenses | Exclusion not an abuse: testimony was irrelevant to proving billing or presigning offenses |
| Exclusion of testimony from Dr. O’Haver and Olga Golding | O’Haver would vouch for care; Olga would report missing petty cash—both impeach prosecution witnesses/bolster defense | Testimony was marginal or irrelevant to elements (face-to-face billing and presigning) | Exclusion not an abuse: district court properly limited irrelevant evidence and cross-examination scope |
Key Cases Cited
- Lindsey v. United States, 702 F.3d 1092 (8th Cir. 2013) (standard of review for evidentiary rulings)
- Shoffner v. United States, 71 F.3d 1429 (8th Cir. 1995) (Rule 404(b) forbids prior-act evidence solely to show criminal disposition)
- Tyerman v. United States, 701 F.3d 552 (8th Cir. 2012) (four-part test for 404(b) admissibility)
- Dupont v. United States, 672 F.3d 580 (8th Cir. 2012) (health-care fraud requires proof of willfulness)
- Franklin v. United States, 250 F.3d 653 (8th Cir. 2001) (reasonableness standard for remoteness of prior acts)
- Betterton v. United States, 417 F.3d 826 (8th Cir. 2005) (presumption that juries follow limiting instructions reduces unfair prejudice)
- Elbert v. United States, 561 F.3d 771 (8th Cir. 2009) (irrelevant evidence not admitted when it does not address elements of charged offense)
- Davis v. United States, 415 U.S. 308 (1974) (scope of cross-examination on bias but subject to relevance limits)
