United States v. Desposito
704 F.3d 221
2d Cir.2013Background
- Desposito set a car on fire to divert police attention while robbing the M&T Bank of about $10,000.
- After the robbery, he burned the lighter fluid can and his clothing to destroy evidence; a DNA-containing ski cap was found later.
- While awaiting trial, Desposito mailed multiple letters instructing others to plant false evidence and thereby raise reasonable doubt.
- Letters were intercepted by a third party and provided to law enforcement; Desposito was indicted for bank robbery, using fire to commit a felony, and attempting to obstruct an official proceeding.
- At trial, the government admitted evidence about a second plan to deter a New Jersey witness, and the district court gave limiting instructions.
- The jury found Desposito guilty on all counts and the district court imposed consecutive and concurrent sentences as required by statute; on appeal, Desposito challenged the sufficiency and legality of the convictions.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether fire was used to commit the felony | Desposito used fire to facilitate the robbery, not to commit it. | Using fire to facilitate a felony is not within § 844(h)(1)’s scope. | Yes, use of fire to commit a felony is satisfied; evidence shows active employment and integral role. |
| Due Process fair warning under § 844(h)(1) | Statutory language provided clear notice of illegality. | Desposito lacked fair warning that his conduct was illegal under the statute. | No due process violation; plain language gives fair warning. |
| Sufficiency of evidence for attempt to obstruct an official proceeding | Letters could obstruct by directing false evidence and influencing trial. | No nexus or substantial step tying letters to obstruction; reliance on third parties makes it speculative. | Sufficient nexus and substantial steps established; conviction affirmed. |
| Admissibility of NJ prosecution plan evidence under Rule 608/403 | Prior bad acts admissible to impeach credibility; probative value outweighs prejudice. | Risk of prejudice from prior state case is high and could mislead jurors. | District court did not abuse discretion; limiting instructions mitigated prejudice. |
Key Cases Cited
- Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137 (U.S. 1995) (defined 'use' as active employment in § 924(c), informs interpretation here)
- Aguilar v. United States, 515 U.S. 593 (U.S. 1995) (nexus requirement for obstructing justice under § 1512(c)(2))
- United States v. Reich, 479 F.3d 179 (2d Cir. 2007) (nexus between act and judicial proceedings for § 1512(c)(2))
- United States v. Geibel, 369 F.3d 682 (2d Cir. 2004) (standard for sufficiency review in conspiracy/obstruction contexts)
- Farhane v. United States, 634 F.3d 127 (2d Cir. 2011) (substantial step formulation for attempt crimes)
- Cullen v. United States, 499 F.3d 157 (2d Cir. 2007) (due process and notice in liability standards)