United States v. Deshpande, 6:18-cr-00131

Background

Deshpande was indicted for receiving, producing child pornography (Count 2) and enticing a minor to engage in sexual activity (Count 3); factual basis: posed as a modeling agent, persuaded a 16‑year‑old to send nude images, blackmailed, met victim in Florida, provided alcohol/drugs, recorded sexual assault, and traveled multiple times.
He pleaded guilty to Counts 2 and 3 under a plea agreement that disclosed statutory ranges (Count 2: 15–30 years; Count 3: 10 years to life) and stated the plea terms were recommendations, not binding on the court; he initialed and signed every page.
At the change‑of‑plea colloquy Deshpande, under oath, acknowledged understanding the charges, statutory penalties, that Guidelines are advisory, and that the court could reject plea recommendations and impose the maximum.
After the government sought a life sentence, Deshpande moved to withdraw his pleas, arguing he hadn’t actually read the agreement, counsel misled him about the Guidelines and promised no prison time (including alleged credit for assistance to Mueller), and the court failed to comply with Rule 11(b)(1)(m).
The district court denied withdrawal, finding Deshpande’s oath and plea‑colloquy statements inconsistent with his motion and that judicial‑resource considerations counseled against withdrawal; the court sentenced him to life imprisonment.
On appeal the Eleventh Circuit affirmed, holding the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying withdrawal.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Deshpande’s plea was knowing and voluntary (i.e., he understood consequences, including Guidelines effects)	Deshpande: counsel didn’t explain Guidelines; he was led to believe he would avoid prison (including due to alleged cooperation), so plea wasn’t knowing/voluntary	Govt/District Ct.: plea colloquy and signed plea agreement show he read and understood the agreement, statutory penalties, and that Guidelines are advisory; his sworn statements are entitled to a strong presumption of truth	Affirmed: plea was knowing and voluntary; district court did not abuse discretion denying withdrawal
Whether district court’s failure to recite Rule 11(b)(1)(m) obligations required reversal	Deshpande: court didn’t inform him of its obligation to calculate/consider the Guidelines, departures, and §3553(a) factors	Govt/District Ct.: any omission was harmless because he was informed of statutory penalties, knew Guidelines existed and were binding in effect, and was sentenced within the authorized range	Affirmed: omission was harmless given his sworn understanding and the circumstances
Application of Rule 11(d)(2)(B)/Buckles factors for motion to withdraw plea	Deshpande: asserted fair and just reason to withdraw given alleged misunderstandings and counsel’s promises	Govt/District Ct.: Buckles factors (assistance of counsel, voluntariness, judicial resources, government prejudice) weighed against withdrawal	Affirmed: court reasonably applied factors and denied withdrawal

Key Cases Cited

United States v. Symington, 781 F.3d 1308 (11th Cir. 2015) (plea withdrawal standard and three core concerns for knowing and voluntary plea)
United States v. Buckles, 843 F.2d 469 (11th Cir. 1988) (factors to consider on pre‑sentence plea‑withdrawal motions)
United States v. Mosley, 173 F.3d 1318 (11th Cir. 1999) (failure to advise of guideline range may be harmless if defendant knew of Guidelines and statutory penalties)
United States v. Medlock, 12 F.3d 185 (11th Cir. 1994) (strong presumption that statements made during plea colloquy are true)
United States v. Rogers, 848 F.2d 166 (11th Cir. 1988) (defendant bears heavy burden to show sworn plea colloquy statements were false)
Martinez v. Court of Appeal of California, 528 U.S. 152 (2000) (criminal defendants’ right to self‑representation does not extend to direct appeals)