United States v. Deshawn Greene
2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 95
| 4th Cir. | 2013Background
- Greene was convicted of armed bank robbery and brandishing a firearm, receiving 30 years total after consecutive sentences.
- The only direct testimony tying Greene to the robbery came from Lear, a co‑defendant with a plea agreement, who testified Greene planned and participated in the robbery.
- Bank teller Bolder identified similarities between Greene and the robber after leading questions in court, despite no in‑person or lineup identification.
- No physical evidence linked Greene to the crime; fingerprints and other items were not found or processed to connect him.
- The district court did not give a Holley‑Telfaire instruction because defense did not request it; the government argued the evidence was not solely dependent on eyewitness testimony.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Bolder's testimony was impermissibly suggestive. | Greene argues the questioning created identification unreliability. | Greene maintains the procedure violated due process and tainted the verdict. | Plain error to admit the testimony. |
| Whether the improperly obtained testimony affected substantial rights. | Error prejudiced the trial by tainting key testimony. | There was strong independent evidence linking Greene to the robbery. | Error did not affect substantial rights; conviction affirmed. |
| Whether a Holley‑Telfaire eyewitness instruction was required. | Instruction should have been given given eyewitness reliance. | Not mandatory when independent corroborating evidence exists. | No reversible error; instruction not required. |
| Whether resemblance testimony can be carved out from traditional eyewitness rules. | Prosecution’s resemblance testimony should be exempt from standard rules. | Resemblance testimony warrants due process protections. | Carve‑out rejected;仍 upheld despite contention. |
Key Cases Cited
- Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98 (U.S. 1977) (two‑step test for admissibility of identification evidence)
- Satcher v. Pruett, 126 F.3d 561 (4th Cir. 1997) (totality of circumstances reliability factors; unnecessarily suggestive test)
- Patler v. Slayton, 503 F.2d 472 (4th Cir. 1974) (descriptions vs. in‑court identification; skepticism of leading procedures)
- United States v. Holley, 502 F.2d 273 (4th Cir. 1974) (Holley‑Telfaire instruction context)
- United States v. Brooks, 449 F.2d 1077 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (recognizes dangers of resemblance testimony and guidance against suggestive questioning)
- United States v. Archibald, 734 F.2d 938 (2d Cir. 1984) (in‑court identifications can be impermissibly suggestive)
- United States v. Rogers, 126 F.3d 655 (5th Cir. 1997) (showing how timing and removal of identity cues affect reliability)
- United States v. Emanuele, 51 F.3d 1123 (3d Cir. 1995) (in‑court identifications following courtroom procedures)
- Biggers v. United States, 409 U.S. 188 (U.S. 1972) (reliability factors for eyewitness identifications)
- Warf v. State, 529 F.2d 1170 (5th Cir. 1976) (prohibition on pointing to defendant during identification)
- Paderick v. United States, 519 F.2d 75 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (warning against suggestive showups and leading questioning)
- Saunders v. United States, 501 F.3d 384 (4th Cir. 2007) (limits of relying on extrinsic evidence in reliability analysis)
- Cedelle v. United States, 89 F.3d 181 (4th Cir. 1996) (in‑court identifications and credibility assessment for juries)
- Wilkerson v. United States, 84 F.3d 692 (4th Cir. 1996) (extrinsic evidence not considered in the initial reliability analysis)
- Emanuele, 51 F.3d 1123 (3d Cir. 1995) (bank teller identification cases; showups and photos)