United States v. Deshawn Dozier
2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 1607
| 4th Cir. | 2017Background
- Deshawn Dozier pled guilty to distributing crack cocaine; PSR recommended career-offender treatment based on two prior state felony convictions.
- The sentencing court treated a prior West Virginia conviction for "attempt to distribute" as a qualifying "controlled substance offense" under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2 and applied the modified categorical approach using extra‑statutory documents.
- Dozier objected, arguing West Virginia’s general attempt statute is broader than the generic controlled-substance attempt and thus does not categorically qualify for the career‑offender enhancement.
- The district court overruled the objection but the Fourth Circuit held the district court used the wrong method: for general attempt statutes courts must compare both (1) the state attempt elements to the generic attempt definition and (2) the elements of the underlying substantive offense to the generic controlled‑substance offense.
- Applying the correct two‑part analysis, the Fourth Circuit concluded West Virginia’s attempt statute corresponds to the generic attempt definition and that the underlying offense (distribution of cocaine, a Schedule II drug) categorically matches a federal controlled‑substance offense.
- Although the district court erred procedurally, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the career‑offender designation on alternative grounds that Dozier’s prior attempt conviction qualified under § 4B1.2.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether West Virginia’s general attempt statute is divisible such that the modified categorical approach applies | Dozier: statute is indivisible and criminalizes broader conduct than generic attempt; modified categorical approach was improperly applied | Gov’t: statute’s classification categories make it divisible; Shepard documents show Dozier’s conviction involved distribution | Court: statute is not divisible for the attempt element; modified categorical approach was applied incorrectly by district court |
| What elements must be compared when a conviction is under a general attempt statute | Dozier: only attempt statute elements need comparison | Gov’t: can apply modified categorical approach to identify underlying offense | Court: must perform a two‑part, elements‑only inquiry — compare state attempt to generic attempt AND compare underlying substantive statute to the generic controlled‑substance offense |
| Whether West Virginia’s attempt elements match the generic definition of attempt | Dozier: WV "overt act" may be broader than the generic "substantial step" | Gov’t: WV elements sufficiently narrow | Court: WV requires specific intent and an overt act that corresponds in substance to a substantial step; match holds |
| Whether the underlying WV offense (attempted distribution of cocaine) is a categorical match for a generic controlled‑substance offense | Dozier: WV statute includes Schedule V misdemeanor category so not always a felony | Gov’t: Dozier’s conviction involved Schedule II cocaine, which is a felony | Court: WV §60A‑4‑401 is divisible; Dozier’s underlying offense involved Schedule II (felony) — categorical match; conviction qualifies under §4B1.2 |
Key Cases Cited
- Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (categorical approach focuses on statutory elements)
- Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276 (modified categorical approach is a limited tool for divisible statutes)
- Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243 (elements‑only inquiry governs divisibility and use of Shepard documents)
- United States v. Cabrera‑Umanzor, 728 F.3d 347 (4th Cir.) (general divisibility is not enough; at least one alternative must match predicate elements)
- United States v. Barcenas‑Yanez, 826 F.3d 752 (4th Cir.) (modified categorical approach may not be used to decide whether to use the modified categorical approach)
- United States v. Gonzalez‑Monterroso, 745 F.3d 1237 (9th Cir.) (two‑part analysis for general attempt statutes: attempt elements and underlying offense elements)
- United States v. Neal, 78 F.3d 901 (4th Cir.) (generic attempt requires intent and a substantial step)
- United States v. Engle, 676 F.3d 405 (4th Cir.) (definitions of substantial step and corroboration of criminal purpose)