United States v. Derek Benedict
815 F.3d 377
| 8th Cir. | 2016Background
- Benedict and Carpenter participated in a multi-year conspiracy (2009–2013) to burglarize pharmacies, gas stations, and other commercial targets to steal cash, ATMs, and controlled pharmaceuticals; several coconspirators pleaded guilty and testified at trial.
- Law enforcement introduced physical evidence (DNA on a glove tying Carpenter to a burglary) and recordings/cooperator testimony (Kielb, Mussehl, Julien, Stanley, Mayotte, Quast) describing roles: Carpenter as safe/ATM driller; Benedict as lookout/driver who bought a car with burglary proceeds.
- Both defendants were tried jointly, convicted on conspiracy and substantive counts, and sentenced as career offenders under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1: Carpenter to 210 months and $272,561 restitution; Benedict to 150 months and $199,007 restitution.
- Benedict moved to sever, sought to admit an expert on accomplice witness effects, and challenged sufficiency of evidence; Carpenter challenged restitution and later the guideline career-offender classification in light of Johnson.
- The district court accepted an evidentiary stipulation (jurisdictional elements), excluded the defense expert for untimely disclosure and for being an improper credibility-comment, and classified prior commercial burglaries as crimes of violence under Eighth Circuit precedent.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Severance of joint trial | Government: joinder proper; efficiency and same conspiracy | Benedict: evidence mainly focused on Carpenter so joinder prejudiced him | Denial affirmed—no severe prejudice; limiting instructions adequate (Delpit standard) |
| Exclusion of defense expert on accomplice-witness bias | Benedict: expert necessary to show unconscious juror bias and evaluate cooperator testimony | Government/district court: untimely Rule 16 disclosure; testimony would impermissibly comment on witness credibility | Affirmed—exclusion not abuse of discretion for untimely disclosure and improper credibility testimony (rule 16 + Nichols) |
| Sufficiency of evidence for Benedict | Benedict: coconspirator testimony lacked corroboration and showed separate conspiracies | Government: multiple coconspirators corroborated Benedict’s participation; documentary evidence (vehicle title) supports testimony | Convictions affirmed—cooperator testimony was credible and corroborated; reviewed de novo in government’s favor |
| Restitution & career-offender classification | Carpenter: corporations not "persons" under MVRA; restitution for store cash improper; Johnson undermines residual clause used for career-offender status | Government: Dictionary Act includes corporations; stores were directly harmed; prior commercial burglaries qualify as crimes of violence under Eighth Circuit precedent (Bell, Stymiest) | Affirmed—corporations may be MVRA victims; restitution to stores proper; career-offender status upheld under circuit precedent despite Johnson question |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Delpit, 94 F.3d 1134 (8th Cir. 1996) (strong presumption favoring joinder of properly joined defendants)
- United States v. Dierling, 131 F.3d 722 (8th Cir. 1997) (standard for severance and jury's ability to separately assess evidence)
- United States v. Martin, 777 F.3d 984 (8th Cir. 2015) (treatment of stipulations and plain-error review for unobjected stipulations)
- United States v. Holmes, 670 F.3d 586 (4th Cir. 2012) (upholding exclusion of expert where Rule 16 disclosures were not made)
- Nichols v. American National Insurance Co., 154 F.3d 875 (8th Cir. 1998) (experts may not be admitted to comment on witness credibility)
- United States v. Thompson, 533 F.3d 964 (8th Cir. 2008) (co-conspirator testimony can suffice unless incredible or insubstantial)
- United States v. Casteel, 717 F.3d 635 (8th Cir. 2013) (standard for reviewing sufficiency of the evidence)
- United States v. Senty-Haugen, 449 F.3d 862 (8th Cir. 2006) (MVRA victims can include government entities like the IRS)
- United States v. Engelmann, 720 F.3d 1005 (8th Cir. 2013) (rejecting limits to MVRA victim status based on victim conduct)
- United States v. Bell, 445 F.3d 1086 (8th Cir. 2006) (commercial burglary qualifies as a crime of violence under the guidelines)
- United States v. Stymiest, 581 F.3d 759 (8th Cir. 2009) (concluding non‑residential commercial burglaries qualify as crimes of violence for career‑offender application)
- Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990) (generic burglary definition relevant to violent‑felony analysis)
- United States v. Ramirez, 196 F.3d 895 (8th Cir. 1999) (scope of indictment and district court discretion for restitution awards)
