United States v. Denny Johnson, Sr.
860 F.3d 1133
| 8th Cir. | 2017Background
- Denny Johnson was convicted after a jury trial of multiple federal offenses for assaulting and raping his estranged wife D.M.; sentenced to 360 months (30 years) imprisonment plus five years supervised release.
- The charged incidents occurred Dec 2013–Jan 2014; D.M. escaped, gave a written statement to police, and later testified at trial. The indictment did not include alleged events before Dec 29, 2013.
- The government introduced two prior tribal-court convictions of Johnson for assaulting D.M. (2004 and 2006) and presented expert testimony by Kristine Heeren‑Graber about general characteristics of domestic‑violence victims based on the Duluth Model.
- Johnson sought to introduce evidence that D.M. had committed prior assaults against him in late 2013; the district court excluded that evidence and limited cross‑examination on that subject.
- The district court admitted D.M.’s written statement to police as an exhibit (despite some inconsistencies with trial testimony) and gave limiting instructions regarding prior‑act evidence.
- At sentencing the court applied Guidelines enhancements for obstruction of justice (USSG §3C1.1) and vulnerable victim (USSG §3A1.1(b)(1)); Johnson challenged both enhancements on appeal.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Admissibility of expert testimony (Heeren‑Graber) | Gov: expert testimony about general DV victim behavior is helpful and not credibility vouching | Johnson: lacked qualification; Daubert hearing required; testimony irrelevant/unduly prejudicial | Court: Affirmed—expert was qualified, testimony general (not case‑specific), helpful under Fed. R. Evid. 702 and not unfairly prejudicial |
| Admission of facts underlying prior tribal convictions | Gov: prior‑conviction facts relevant to elements of §117 and to intent/knowledge; admissible under Rule 404(b) | Johnson: prejudicial character evidence and irrelevant beyond §117 | Court: Affirmed—testimony met Rule 401 and 404(b) criteria; probative value outweighed prejudice; limiting instructions sufficed |
| Exclusion of evidence of D.M.’s alleged prior bad acts (defense proffer) | Johnson: needed to impeach credibility and show his state of mind (Gregg) | Gov: would cause mini‑trials, marginal relevance; not offered to show fear/self‑defense | Court: Affirmed—district court within Confrontation Clause discretion; Gregg inapplicable because Johnson did not assert fear/self‑defense |
| Admission of D.M.’s written pretrial statement as exhibit | Johnson: admission unfairly bolstered D.M.’s testimony | Gov: statement consistent with escape/reporting; impeaches in parts | Court: Affirmed (harmless even if error)—statement actually contained omissions helpful to defense and was used in cross‑examination |
| Sentencing enhancements: obstruction and vulnerable victim | Johnson: obstruction enhancement improperly based on pre‑offense conduct; vulnerable‑victim overlaps (double counting) with force/rape enhancement | Gov: threats to prevent reporting fit §3C1.1; vulnerability factors (isolation, weather risk) distinct from force used in rape | Court: Affirmed—pre‑offense threats may support §3C1.1; vulnerable‑victim enhancement did not impermissibly double count because it relied on factors separate from force |
Key Cases Cited
- Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579 (expert‑admissibility standard)
- Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (district courts have broad latitude on expert reliability)
- United States v. Kirkie, 261 F.3d 761 (permitting generalized expert testimony about victim behavior)
- United States v. Drapeau, 827 F.3d 773 (prior‑conviction testimony relevant to §117 elements)
- United States v. Walker, 428 F.3d 1165 (Rule 404(b) is a rule of inclusion; prior‑act evidence admissible for permissible purposes)
- United States v. Strong, 826 F.3d 1109 (impermissible double counting occurs only when identical conduct is used twice)