United States v. DeJesus, 6 F.4th 141

deJesús participated in a multi-state drug distribution conspiracy supplying "trap houses" in Maine; in a one-month period he moved a converted drug weight of 1,874.11 kilograms and possessed a firearm.
He was arrested after a daylight shootout in a Walmart parking lot; cellphone evidence led to a federal indictment for conspiracy to distribute controlled substances (21 U.S.C. §§ 841, 846).
While on pretrial release and shortly before his change-of-plea hearing, he stole $1,500 from his employer (Speedway), pleaded guilty to petit larceny, and was sentenced to time served.
He later pleaded guilty to the federal conspiracy charge; the PSI recommended total offense level 34, CHC I, GSR 151–188 months and declined to recommend a §3E1.1 acceptance-of-responsibility reduction because of the theft.
The district court adopted the guideline calculations, denied the §3E1.1 reduction based on the new offense and its particular circumstances, but imposed a downwardly variant 130-month sentence (21 months below the guideline range).
On appeal deJesús challenged (1) procedural error in denying the acceptance adjustment and (2) substantive unreasonableness of the 130-month sentence. The First Circuit affirmed.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the district court procedurally erred by denying an acceptance-of-responsibility reduction under USSG §3E1.1	The court properly denied the reduction because deJesús committed a new, significant theft while on pretrial release and the court explained individualized, case-specific reasons (amount, breach of trust, timing, planning).	The court applied a general policy (rather than individualized analysis), overstated the theft, and failed to give adequate weight to the timely guilty plea.	No procedural error: court showed individualized consideration, explained why the new offense undercut sincerity of acceptance, and its factual findings were not clearly erroneous.
Whether the 130-month downwardly variant sentence is substantively unreasonable	The sentence is reasonable: the court gave a plausible rationale (major role in trafficking, firearm/shootout, but also mitigating youth/trauma/plea), and substantial deference is owed to the district court's balancing; a 130‑month term is defensible.	The sentence is longer than necessary and unjustified; deJesús points to disparity with co-conspirators and argues a lower term (120 months) was sufficient.	Sentence is substantively reasonable: court articulated a plausible rationale and result is defensible; comparisons to other conspirators were unpersuasive.

United States v. Flores-Machicote, 706 F.3d 16 (1st Cir. 2013) (district courts must ground sentencing determinations in case-specific factors)
United States v. D'Angelo, 802 F.3d 205 (1st Cir. 2015) (defendant bears burden to prove entitlement to §3E1.1 reduction; plea alone does not guarantee it)
United States v. Carrington, 96 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1996) (court may decline §3E1.1 reduction based on post-charge new offense)
Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007) (reasonableness review of sentencing and deference to district court)
Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338 (2007) (deference to within-guideline sentences and appellate review framework)
United States v. Jiminez, 498 F.3d 82 (1st Cir. 2007) (district court need not credit self-serving testimony)
United States v. Rodríguez-Cruz, 997 F.3d 362 (1st Cir. 2021) (contextual reading of sentencing remarks; apparent stray comments cannot be isolated)
United States v. Clogston, 662 F.3d 588 (1st Cir. 2011) (two-step review: procedural then substantive reasonableness)
United States v. Miranda-Díaz, 942 F.3d 33 (1st Cir. 2019) (application of the two-step sentencing review)