142 F.4th 192
4th Cir.2025Background
- Dehaven Craig pleaded guilty to unlawful possession of a firearm as a felon, in exchange for dismissal of drug charges per a plea agreement with the government.
- The plea agreement included a key paragraph (“relevant conduct stipulation”) setting forth agreed-upon facts, referencing the Guidelines definitions of total relevant conduct.
- During the plea colloquy, both parties and the court expressly confirmed that the stipulated facts in paragraph nine constituted Craig’s total relevant conduct for sentencing.
- At sentencing, the government sought two enhancements (for use of a stolen gun and connection to another felony) based on facts not included in the stipulation.
- The district court sided with the government, applied the enhancements, and sentenced Craig to a higher range accordingly; Craig appealed, alleging breach of the plea agreement.
Issues
| Issue | Craig's Argument | Government's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Did the plea agreement stipulate all relevant conduct for sentencing (precluding enhancements outside the stipulation)? | Paragraph nine contained all stipulated relevant conduct, so enhancements based on other facts breached the agreement. | The stipulation covered only facts needed for guilt, so enhancements could be sought based on other facts. | The stipulation set forth total relevant conduct; seeking enhancements outside it breached the agreement. |
| Did the government's right/duty to provide information to the court excuse compliance with the stipulation? | Duty of candor does not permit breach of explicit plea stipulation. | Duty to inform court and correct record permitted seeking enhancements. | Duty of candor does not override plea agreement commitments; breach occurred. |
| Appropriate remedy for breach of plea agreement | Specific performance and resentencing before a different judge. | Not explicitly addressed. | Vacatur and remand for resentencing before a different judge. |
| Effect of appellate waiver in plea agreement | Waiver does not prevent argument that the agreement was breached. | Waiver bars some grounds for appeal. | Waiver does not bar claim of breach; government’s motion to dismiss denied as moot. |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Warner, 820 F.3d 678 (4th Cir. 2016) (Heightened scrutiny for plea agreements; traditional contract principles apply, but government held to higher standard)
- United States v. Harvey, 791 F.2d 294 (4th Cir. 1986) (Ambiguities in plea agreements construed against the government)
- United States v. Dawson, 587 F.3d 640 (4th Cir. 2009) (Appellate waivers do not bar review of government breach claims)
- United States v. Peglera, 33 F.3d 412 (4th Cir. 1994) (Remand for resentencing before a different judge after plea agreement breach)
