United States v. Dean
2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33094
D. Or.2016Background
- Dean pleaded guilty in 2014 to being a felon in possession of firearms (18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)); plea agreement recommended 60 months and included waivers of appeal/post-conviction relief but preserved constitutional claims.
- Presentence calculation applied U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(4)(A) (base offense level 20) based on a prior 2005 state conviction for fleeing/eluding police, treated as a “crime of violence” under the Guidelines’ residual clause (§ 4B1.2(a)(2)); total offense level produced an advisory range of 63–78 months (reduced to 51–63 after a downward variance) and Judge Haggerty imposed 60 months concurrent with a supervised-release revocation sentence.
- Johnson v. United States (2015) held the ACCA residual clause unconstitutionally vague; Dean moved under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 arguing Johnson also invalidates the identically worded residual clause in the Career-Offender Guideline, meaning his base level should have been 14 not 20.
- The Government conceded the Guidelines’ residual clause is unconstitutionally vague and that the enhancement would not apply today, but argued Dean’s § 2255 motion is barred by procedural default and that Johnson does not retroactively apply to Guidelines errors under Teague.
- The Court found Dean established cause (the legal basis was not reasonably available pre-Johnson) and actual prejudice (the constitutional Guidelines error substantially increased his advisory range), rejected the Government’s Lockhart/Nagi analogies, held Johnson’s rule is substantive for purposes of retroactivity in the Ninth Circuit, granted the § 2255 motion, vacated the judgment, and ordered resentencing.
Issues
| Issue | Dean's Argument | Government's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Procedural default | Dean: Johnson overruled Sykes; the claim was not reasonably available on direct appeal (cause) and the Guidelines error caused substantial prejudice | Govt: Dean defaulted by not appealing; rule is new so Teague/nonretroactivity and default should bar relief; also argues no prejudice because same sentence could be imposed | Court: Dean showed cause and actual prejudice; procedural default excused and claim reached on merits |
| Applicability of Johnson to Guidelines residual clause | Dean: Johnson’s vagueness holding applies to identically worded § 4B1.2(a)(2) so enhancement unconstitutional | Govt: Although Johnson applies to ACCA, its effect in Guidelines context is procedural and non-retroactive | Court: Government conceded vagueness; court accepts application of Johnson to § 4B1.2(a)(2) and that enhancement was unconstitutional |
| Retroactivity under Teague (Guidelines context) | Dean: Under Ninth Circuit precedent (Reina‑Rodriguez/Grisel analogy), a rule that is substantive in ACCA context is substantive in Guidelines context and thus retroactive | Govt: Johnson is substantive for ACCA but procedural/non‑watershed for advisory Guidelines and thus not retroactive | Court: Following Ninth Circuit approach in Reina‑Rodriguez, Johnson is substantive as applied here and Teague does not bar relief; Johnson applies retroactively |
| Relief and remedy | Dean: Vacate sentence and resentence without the § 4B1.2(a)(2) enhancement | Govt: Even if enhancement invalid, would urge same 60‑month sentence; claim may be noncognizable on collateral review | Court: Granted § 2255 relief, vacated judgment, ordered resentencing and allowed Rule 32 objections and new argument by both sides |
Key Cases Cited
- Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015) (held ACCA residual clause void for vagueness)
- Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989) (retroactivity framework for new constitutional rules)
- Reina‑Rodriguez v. United States, 655 F.3d 1182 (9th Cir. 2011) (Ninth Circuit treated Grisel as substantive and applied retroactivity analysis in Guidelines-like context)
- Grisel v. United States, 488 F.3d 844 (9th Cir. 2007) (categorical approach decision affecting enhancement applicability)
- Peugh v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2072 (2013) (Guidelines are the starting point for sentencing; Guidelines range changes affect sentences)
- Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348 (2004) (distinction between substantive and procedural rules for retroactivity)
- Frady v. United States, 456 U.S. 152 (1982) (cause-and-prejudice standard for excusing procedural default)
- Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619 (1993) (harmless-error standard for habeas)