United States v. De La Cruz, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 15277

Background

Defendant Renato De La Cruz, a Dominican national, entered the U.S. illegally and obtained another person’s identity documents (Alberto Pena) to procure a passport, green card, and a Social Security number.
Between Dec. 2010 and Oct. 2012 De La Cruz received unemployment benefits (including federally funded extensions) totaling $11,340 using Pena’s identity.
ICE arrested De La Cruz on Dec. 18, 2012 at an apartment; he was read Miranda warnings, admitted using Pena’s identity at the scene, later was processed administratively, then again waived Miranda and signed a written confession to DOL criminal investigators.
Indicted on three counts: theft of public money (18 U.S.C. § 641), use of a falsely obtained Social Security number (42 U.S.C. § 408(a)(7)(A)), and aggravated identity theft (18 U.S.C. § 1028A). Jury convicted on all counts after a three-day trial.
District court denied suppression motions (challenging arrest without administrative warrant, apartment entry consent, and Miranda waiver); sentenced to concurrent one-month terms on counts 1–2 and consecutive 24 months on count 3. Defendant appealed.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Government)	Defendant's Argument (De La Cruz)	Held
Lawfulness of arrest / suppression remedy	Arrest lawful or statutory violation does not require suppression absent constitutional violation	ICE exceeded 8 U.S.C. § 1357 by arresting without administrative warrant; thus statements are fruit of illegal arrest and must be suppressed	Court assumed statutory violation but held exclusionary rule inapplicable; statutory violation alone (without constitutional abridgement) does not mandate suppression; denial affirmed
Consent to apartment entry / effect on statements	Even if entry was invalid, statements made outside apartment and later at station were not product of that entry	Entry into apartment was nonconsensual so subsequent statements are tainted fruit	Court found no causal link: statements were given outside, after probable cause arrest, and thus admissible (New York v. Harris reasoning)
Miranda/conflicting administrative warnings	Government distinguished administrative warnings from criminal Miranda warnings; later Miranda waiver was knowing and voluntary	Prior administrative warnings (stating counsel may not be free) conflicted with Miranda and rendered later waiver invalid	Court held Miranda warnings were given before and again after administrative warnings by different officials in different rooms/times; no substantial risk of confusion—waiver valid
Sufficiency of evidence for aggravated identity theft and theft of public funds	Evidence (admissions, use of Pena’s name and DOB, applications) established use of another’s means of identification and intent to deprive govt.	Name and DOB alone were insufficient to identify the real Pena; defendant had honest belief he was entitled to benefits	Court held evidence sufficient: name + DOB can be a “means of identification” under §1028A; admissions established criminal intent for theft; convictions affirmed

Key Cases Cited

Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331 (statutory violations alone do not automatically trigger suppression)
New York v. Harris, 495 U.S. 14 (statements at station admissible despite unlawful home entry when supported by probable cause)
Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (warrantless, nonconsensual home entry to effect an arrest is generally prohibited)
Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 (statements may be involuntary fruit of illegal arrest when arrest lacks probable cause)
Savarese v. United States, 686 F.3d 1 (name alone can be a “means of identification” under §1028)
Kuc v. United States, 737 F.3d 129 (use of victim’s identifying information can satisfy §1028A means-of-identification requirement)
Adams v. United States, 740 F.3d 40 (suppression is “strong medicine” and rare)