United States v. Davis, 103 F. Supp. 3d 396

Defendant Matthew Davis was charged in a multi-count indictment including conspiracy and substantive murder-for-hire counts (Counts Two and Three) and related firearm counts (Counts Four and Five) arising from the September 10, 2010 murder of Terry Harrison.
Trial began March 30, 2015; at the close of the Government’s case the defendant made a timely Rule 29 motion for judgment of acquittal focused exclusively on the statute’s “pecuniary value” element (18 U.S.C. § 1958).
The Government’s theory relied largely on testimony of cooperating witness/shooter Kevin Wilson: he initially agreed to kill after being threatened, later testified he thought he "could have got money out of it" and that Davis told him he would “hold [him] down,” and Wilson received $1,000 from the drug crew after the murder.
Wilson repeatedly denied any prior explicit promise of money, amount, or other specific economic consideration before the killing; his testimony described vague street-code assurances (e.g., “hold you down”) with multiple possible meanings.
The court reserved decision under Fed. R. Crim. P. 29(b) and, after reviewing briefing and controlling precedent, concluded the evidence was legally insufficient to prove the pecuniary-value element required for § 1958 convictions.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Sufficiency of evidence that the solicitor promised or agreed to pay "anything of pecuniary value" under § 1958	Government: Davis’s pre- and post-murder statements ("I got you" and "it was payday") plus post-murder $1,000 payment permit a rational juror to infer an intent to pay and a bargained-for exchange	Davis: No explicit promise or dollar amount was made before the murder; only vague promises (“hold you down”) and hope of benefit, insufficient as a matter of law	Court: Judgment of acquittal granted — no rational juror could find the pecuniary-value element proved; vague, unspecified favors are legally insufficient
Whether mutual understanding or shooter’s knowledge is required (is solicitor’s intent alone controlling)	Government: Solicitor’s intent controls per Hardwick; shooter’s subjective understanding is not necessary	Defense: § 1958 requires mutuality — a bargained-for exchange; the shooter must have understood he would receive something of pecuniary value	Court: Mutuality required — solicitor’s intent alone is insufficient when the shooter received no communicated or understood promise of pecuniary value before the killing

United States v. Frampton, 382 F.3d 213 (2d Cir. 2004) (requires that consideration be something the primary significance of which is economic; favors or vague promises are insufficient)
United States v. Hardwick, 523 F.3d 94 (2d Cir. 2008) (interprets § 1958’s consideration element as a traditional bargained-for exchange; discusses solicitor’s intent)
United States v. Chong, 419 F.3d 1076 (9th Cir. 2005) (requires evidence that hitman understood he would receive pecuniary value; vague evidence insufficient)
United States v. Gibson, 580 F.3d 606 (7th Cir. 2009) (permits inference from unambiguous coded language where terms clearly denote monetary payment)
United States v. Acierno, 579 F.3d 694 (6th Cir. 2009) (upholds conviction where negotiations and explicit mentions of money or insurance proceeds supported a finding of pecuniary consideration)
United States v. Wicklund, 114 F.3d 151 (10th Cir. 1997) (construing § 1958 to require mutual understanding of exchange; payment before or after murder can satisfy mutuality)