United States v. Davis
78 F. Supp. 3d 17
D.D.C.2015Background
- Defendant Sherri Davis is charged with conspiracy to defraud the United States, aiding and assisting false tax return preparation, and filing false individual income tax returns for conduct from 2006–2013.
- Davis designated Dr. Robert Madsen, a clinical and forensic psychologist, to testify that she has ADHD (predominantly inattentive type) and to explain how ADHD symptoms affect functioning.
- Dr. Madsen’s initial report diagnosed ADHD but did not connect the diagnosis to the tax-related offenses; a later supplemental proffer described ADHD symptoms (inattention, distractibility, errors completing detailed forms) but still did not tie them to the charged conduct.
- At hearing, Dr. Madsen admitted he could not link Davis’s ADHD to the specific conduct and testified ADHD would not prevent completion of the charged crimes; he had not reviewed or been told details of Davis’s tax preparation work or the charges.
- The Government moved in limine to exclude the testimony under Rules 702 and 403; the Court granted the motion, concluding the proffered testimony lacked the necessary link to mens rea and risked misleading the jury.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Admissibility under Fed. R. Evid. 702/Daubert: whether psychiatric evidence may be admitted to negate specific intent | Gov't: Exclude Madsen because his testimony lacks a reliable, relevant link between ADHD and the mens rea for tax offenses | Davis: ADHD symptoms (inattention, careless errors) are relevant to whether she willfully formed intent; Madsen will explain symptom effects | Held: Excluded — Madsen failed to establish the requisite link between ADHD and the mens rea at issue; testimony not helpful under Rule 702 |
| Whether expert may opine on ultimate issue of intent | Gov't: Such testimony improperly intrudes on jury’s role and Rule 704 forbids opinion on defendant’s mental state as ultimate element | Davis: Proffers limited to diagnosis and symptom effects, not direct opinion on intent | Held: Court relied on Rule 704 limits and found proffer insufficiently tied to intent; risk of intrusion remains |
| Relevance given expert’s lack of case-specific knowledge | Gov't: Madsen did not review or consider the charges or Davis’s work tasks; therefore cannot link diagnosis to charged conduct | Davis: Supplemental proffer attempted to explain how symptomatology would affect task performance | Held: Court found absence of case-specific factual basis dispositive — expert’s refusal to review charges undermined relevance |
| Exclusion under Fed. R. Evid. 403 (prejudicial/ confusing) | Gov't: Even if marginally relevant, danger of misleading jury and inviting excuse/justification outweighs probative value | Davis: Probative value of explaining ADHD effects justifies admission | Held: Court ruled probative value (if any) substantially outweighed by danger of misleading jury; testimony excluded under Rule 403 |
Key Cases Cited
- Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579 (1993) (trial court gatekeeping requirement for expert reliability and relevance)
- United States v. Childress, 58 F.3d 693 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (psychiatric evidence may negate specific intent if limited to diagnosis, bases, and characteristics without opining on ultimate intent)
- United States v. Cameron, 907 F.2d 1051 (11th Cir. 1990) (danger that psychiatric evidence may distract jury and become excuse/justification)
- United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (reliability/helpfulness inquiry for psychiatric testimony)
- United States v. Boykoff, 186 F. Supp. 2d 347 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (excluding psychiatric testimony where expert showed no awareness of the nature of charges and failed to link disorder to mens rea)
- United States v. Gold, 661 F. Supp. 1127 (D.D.C. 1987) (limiting expert testimony to diagnosis and factual bases to avoid encroaching on ultimate issue)