United States v. Davis
2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 23118
1st Cir.2014Background
- Cletus E. Davis, a felon on state probation, was indicted for being a felon in possession of firearms under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). He pled guilty conditionally to preserve suppression and sentencing challenges.
- Probation officer Omiecinski, alerted to guns/drugs at the home, conducted a probation home visit with other officers; Davis was handcuffed for officer safety but told he was not under arrest and could be released if checks were clear.
- During the visit Davis told Omiecinski a .22 rifle was in a child’s bedroom; officers then found that rifle and an M44 rifle in the bathroom. After discovery Davis was arrested and transported to the sheriff’s station.
- While handcuffed in transport (before Miranda warnings), Davis made a volunteered remark to Sergeant Bryant suggesting he was angry his girlfriend had not removed the guns. Bryant did not question further, intending to give Miranda warnings at the jail.
- District court denied suppression; at sentencing the court classified Davis as an armed career criminal under the ACCA and imposed the 15-year mandatory minimum. Davis appealed suppression rulings and the ACCA designation.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Davis’s statement in the squad car was obtained in violation of Miranda (custodial interrogation) | Government: Bryant’s brief general questions were not the functional equivalent of interrogation; the comment was volunteered. | Davis: The transport was custodial and the officer’s questions prompted the incriminating remark; Miranda protections apply. | Court: Statement was volunteered, not interrogation; admissible. |
| Whether Davis’s earlier statement to the probation officer (about the rifle in the child’s bedroom) should be suppressed for Miranda error (raised for first time on appeal) | Government: Even if Miranda error, any error was not plain and did not prejudice Davis because the rifles would have been discovered lawfully during the probation search. | Davis: Statement should have been suppressed; he preserved Fifth Amendment rights and conviction relies on his admissions. | Court: Review is for plain error; custody status was debatable so error not ‘‘plain’’ and, alternatively, no prejudice because other lawful facts supported conviction. |
| Whether vehicular flight under Fla. Stat. § 316.1935(1) qualifies as an ACCA violent-felony predicate | Government: The statute criminalizes vehicular flight and is categorically a violent felony under Sykes. | Davis: § 316.1935(1) is divisible and could encompass non-vehicular flight; his indictment doesn’t specify vehicular flight so it cannot serve as an ACCA predicate. | Court: Statute requires being the operator of a vehicle; both alternatives involve vehicular flight, so statute is indivisible and qualifies as a violent felony. |
| Whether Davis’s prior convictions used for ACCA enhancement must be alleged in the indictment | Government: Prior convictions need not be charged in the indictment for ACCA enhancement. | Davis: ACCA predicates should be charged. | Court: Rejected Davis’s argument; prior convictions need not be in the indictment. |
Key Cases Cited
- Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (establishes Miranda rule for custodial interrogation)
- Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (defines "interrogation" and the "functional equivalent" standard)
- Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (reaffirms Miranda)
- Sykes v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2267 (vehicular flight poses serious risk and can be an ACCA predicate)
- James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192 (categorical approach for defining ACCA violent felonies)
- Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276 (limits use of modified categorical approach to divisible statutes)
- United States v. Ridolfi, 768 F.3d 57 (constructive possession and knowledge for § 922(g) convictions)
- United States v. Rodriguez, 759 F.3d 113 (plain-error standard explained)