United States v. Davila
856 F.3d 141
| 1st Cir. | 2017Background
- Five applicants (Berroa, Julio Castro, Geraldo Castro, Pacheco, Davila) failed required Puerto Rico medical licensing exams and obtained falsified passing score sheets prepared by Board employee Yolanda Rodriguez; those falsified results were placed in applicants’ files and led to issuance of medical licenses.
- Defendants were indicted on an omnibus superseding indictment including counts for conspiracy to commit honest-services mail fraud (18 U.S.C. §§ 371, 1341, 1346), money or property mail fraud (18 U.S.C. § 1341), and aggravated identity theft (18 U.S.C. § 1028A).
- At trial a jury convicted various defendants on honest-services mail fraud conspiracy counts; some were also convicted of mail fraud and aggravated identity theft.
- The government’s theory for mail fraud: defendants used their fraudulently obtained licenses to practice medicine and obtain payment for services (and prescriptions), thereby obtaining money or property “by means of” the underlying fraud.
- The government’s theory for aggravated identity theft: defendants used patients’ names/addresses on prescriptions, constituting use of another’s means of identification “in relation to” specified crimes.
- The First Circuit affirms honest-services mail fraud conspiracy convictions but reverses convictions for money/property mail fraud and aggravated identity theft as legally insufficient; remands for resentencing where appropriate.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sufficiency of evidence for money/property mail fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 1341 | Govt: falsified licenses led to later receipt of payments for medical services — the payments were obtained "by means of" the fraud | Defendants: payments years later were too attenuated; licenses are regulatory and not property of the Board | Reversed: evidence insufficient — under Loughrin the fraud must be the mechanism that "naturally induces" the loss; causal nexus lacking |
| Validity of honest-services mail fraud conspiracy (18 U.S.C. §§ 371, 1341, 1346) | Govt: defendants conspired to deprive Board of employee Rodriguez’s honest services (bribes/kickbacks) and mailings were foreseeable | Defendants: challenge sufficiency and scope of overt acts | Affirmed: sufficient evidence defendants gave value to Rodriguez for falsified scores and mailings were foreseeable |
| Aggravated identity theft (18 U.S.C. § 1028A) for using patients’ names on prescriptions | Govt: printing patient names on prescriptions was use of a means of identification in relation to mail fraud | Defendants: that use did not impersonate patients or otherwise match the identity-theft paradigm Congress targeted | Reversed: “use” requires impersonation or acting on another’s behalf; mere inclusion of names on prescriptions insufficient |
| Other trial errors (indictment surplusage/amendment, evidentiary rulings, judicial bias, witness immunity, jury instructions, prosecutorial misconduct, sentencing enhancement) | Govt: contested rulings were proper or harmless; sentencing enhancement applied to benefit from license | Defendants: various procedural and evidentiary errors, claimed bias, requested immunity, requested specific jury instructions, objected to burden-shifting and enhancement scope | Mostly rejected: district court’s choices largely affirmed; one sentencing remand for those whose mail fraud convictions were vacated |
Key Cases Cited
- McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350 (1987) (mail fraud statute is limited to protection of property rights)
- Cleveland v. United States, 531 U.S. 12 (2000) (state/municipal licenses are regulatory and generally not "property" under mail fraud statute)
- Loughrin v. United States, 573 U.S. 351 (2014) (for bank fraud § 1344, the false statement must be the mechanism that "naturally induces" the bank or its custodian to part with money)
- Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358 (2010) (honest-services statute criminalizes schemes involving bribes or kickbacks)
- United States v. Christopher, 142 F.3d 46 (1st Cir. 1998) (mail/wire fraud does not require that the deceived person be the same as the person deprived of money/property; deception must cause the loss)
