United States v. David Vance
764 F.3d 667
| 7th Cir. | 2014Background
- Vance, along with Marshall and Bluford, was charged with two 2007 bank robberies and related offenses; Vance faced a death- or life-penalty if a killing occurred during the robbery.
- Marshall and Bluford pled guilty; Vance proceeded to trial and was convicted on multiple counts, including a bank robbery with killing.
- The government introduced evidence of three pre-bank-robbery restaurant robberies to show Vance’s identity as a robber, not his propensity.
- The district court issued limiting instructions; one instruction linked to identity limits but was deemed imperfect in scope and clarity.
- DNA evidence found Vance’s DNA on gloves near the getaway car; other witnesses linked Vance to the robberies and surveillance photos aided identification.
- Vance received a life sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 2113(e) for the killing during a bank robbery, with additional consecutive terms and supervised-release conditions.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| May other-crimes evidence be admitted to prove identity? | Vance’s restaurant robberies show propensity, risking prejudice. | Evidence supports identity; probative value outweighs prejudice under Rule 404(b). | Yes; admissible for identity if probative value not substantially outweighed by prejudice. |
| Were limiting instructions adequate to prevent propensity inference? | Instructions were vague and could not curb improper use. | No issue raised; limiting instructions acceptable. | Court found limitations were insufficiently explained and improved instructions would help, but the issue was not appealed. |
| Was the DNA evidence properly admitted and evaluated under Daubert? | DNA evidence validity was contested due to collection/transfer concerns. | DNA testimony was reliable; multiple pretrial hearings supported admissibility. | DNA evidence properly admitted; Daubert concerns addressed by pretrial proceedings. |
| Does 18 U.S.C. § 2113(e) provide a coherent basis for a life sentence when death did not occur as intended? | Statute is clear: life if death results; otherwise 10 years. | Statute is muddled but the intended meaning is that abduction-plus-kill triggers life. | Statute text is nonsensical, but the court inferred Congress intended life for abduction with death; rule of lenity not controlling. |
| Are the supervised-release conditions and consecutive terms appropriate when one sentence is life? | Unclear practical effect since life sentence dominates. | Imposition of supervised release in life cases is routine and permissible. | Judgment stands; practice acknowledged and not overturned. |
Key Cases Cited
- Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440 (Supreme Court 1949) (limits of limiting instructions' effectiveness against prejudice)
- Maus v. Baker, 747 F.3d 926 (7th Cir. 2014) (limitations on propensity inference and other-acts evidence)
- United States v. Mazzone, 782 F.2d 757 (7th Cir. 1986) (Rule 404(b) analysis framework)
- United States v. Jones, 455 F.3d 800 (7th Cir. 2006) (propensity inferences and limiting instructions guidance)
- United States v. Edwards, 581 F.3d 604 (7th Cir. 2009) (falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus rejected; credibility may vary)
- United States v. Williams, 698 F.3d 374 (7th Cir. 2012) (identification from partially masked surveillance photo)
- United States v. Parks, 700 F.3d 775 (6th Cir. 2012) (abduction and punishment under § 2113(e))
- United States v. Turner, 389 F.3d 111 (4th Cir. 2004) (interpretation of § 2113(e) abduction and sentencing)
- United States v. Brown, 333 U.S. 18 (Supreme Court 1948) (canon against absurd results in statutory interpretation)
- United States v. Kirby, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 482 (Supreme Court 1868) (early statutory interpretation principles)