United States v. David Stuart, 1 F.4th 326

Defendant David Christopher Stuart robbed a U.S. Post Office clerk on June 6, 2018, using an Airsoft pellet gun; he pleaded guilty to violating 18 U.S.C. § 2114(a).
The probation officer’s PSR assigned three criminal-history points to a North Carolina conviction from July 30, 2015 (Paragraph 27): originally a suspended 6–17 month sentence, later activated on May 10, 2016; Stuart also had a separate September 2015 methamphetamine conviction (Paragraph 28) sentenced May 10, 2016 to 11–23 months.
The PSR treated the Paragraph 27 and Paragraph 28 convictions as separate prior sentences (3 points each), yielding a total that placed Stuart in Criminal History Category VI.
Stuart objected, arguing the activated Paragraph 27 sentence should not be counted separately (either because it remained effectively suspended or because the two sentences were related by being imposed the same day), which would reduce his criminal-history score.
The district court overruled the objection, adopted the PSR scoring, and sentenced Stuart to 130 months (bottom of the Guidelines range).
On appeal, Stuart renewed the challenge to the criminal-history scoring; the Fourth Circuit affirmed, holding the Guidelines’ plain language and precedent required separate counting.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether a fully suspended state sentence that is later activated on the same day another sentence is imposed must be treated as related (or still suspended) and thus scored with fewer points under the Sentencing Guidelines	Stuart: activation at the same hearing means the sentences are related or the first remains effectively suspended, so it should receive only one point (or the two convictions should be treated as a single prior sentence)	Government/PSR/District Court: the offenses were separated by an intervening arrest; activation at the same hearing does not merge sentences — Guidelines §4A1.2(a)(2) and §4A1.2(k) require separate computation	Affirmed: Paragraph 27 properly received three points; offenses counted separately because the underlying conduct was separated by an intervening arrest and Guidelines commentary treats activations as revocations for counting purposes

United States v. Huggins, 191 F.3d 532 (4th Cir. 1999) (intervening arrest makes offenses separately countable under §4A1.2)
United States v. Davis, 720 F.3d 215 (4th Cir. 2013) (no substantive difference in §4A1.2 versions; intervening-arrest rule applies)
United States v. Ellis, 525 F.3d 960 (10th Cir. 2008) (sentences entered at same hearing do not make offenses related when an intervening arrest separates the underlying conduct)
United States v. Stewart, [citation="383 F. App'x 350"] (4th Cir. 2010) (treating activation of a suspended North Carolina sentence as a revocation for §4A1.2(k)(1) purposes)
United States v. Westbrooks, 780 F.3d 593 (4th Cir. 2015) (preservation requirement for appellate review of sentencing objections)
United States v. Thompson, 874 F.3d 412 (4th Cir. 2017) (standard of review discussion for preserved and unpreserved sentencing issues)