962 F.3d 317
7th Cir.2020Background
- David L. Shanks was charged in federal court with drug-distribution offenses (including allegations of an overdose-related death) while on supervised release; he fired his initial lawyer, refused to cooperate with appointed counsel, and disputed the court's jurisdiction.
- Shanks repeatedly refused to accept a court order compelling his attendance and told jail staff and the court he would not come to federal court; he never appeared in the courthouse for trial.
- Anticipating disruption, the district judge, counsel, and a court reporter went to Brown County Jail on the morning jury selection began and put the proceedings on the record before Shanks’s cell.
- On the jail record the judge explained the charges and asked more than ten times whether Shanks would attend and cooperate; Shanks repeatedly said he did not understand the charges and would not answer whether he would come to court or resist transport.
- The judge concluded Shanks’s conduct amounted to a voluntary, knowing waiver of his right to be present and, to avoid harm in forcibly bringing him, proceeded with jury selection and trial in court while Shanks remained at the jail; Shanks was convicted and later sentenced in absentia.
Issues
| Issue | Shanks' Argument | Government's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Fed. R. Crim. P. 43 requires the initial presence to be in a courtroom | Rule 43 requires the defendant be physically in a courtroom when trial begins | Rule 43 does not demand a courtroom; initial in-person presence before the judge suffices | Court: Rule 43 satisfied by judge meeting defendant in jail; "initially present" met the day jury selection began |
| Whether starting trial at jail violated the Constitution (Fifth/Sixth) | Constitutions require protections incompatible with starting trial at jail | Rule 43 governs and its protections were satisfied; no separate constitutional violation | Court: No constitutional violation once Rule 43 complied with; no further constitutional analysis required |
| Whether Shanks knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to be present by disruptive conduct | Court erred in finding waiver; his refusal was based on lack of understanding, not waiver | His repeated refusals, prior conduct, and refusal to accept the order showed implied waiver; public interest favored proceeding | Court: District court’s factual finding of waiver was not clearly erroneous and its public-interest balancing was proper |
| Whether any Rule 43 error (if technical) is structural or subject to harmless-error review | Absence was fundamental and not subject to harmless-error review | Any Rule 43 error would be non-structural and subject to harmless-error review; no prejudice shown | Court: If technical error existed it was reviewable for harmlessness; no prejudice shown and conviction affirmed |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Benabe, 654 F.3d 753 (7th Cir. 2011) (interpreting Rule 43’s "initially present" timing and approving implied-waiver analysis)
- United States v. Sterling, 738 F.3d 228 (11th Cir. 2013) (trial may begin where defendant is initially present outside a courtroom when defendant refuses to enter)
- United States v. Thompson, 599 F.3d 595 (7th Cir. 2010) (discussing harmless-error review for Rule-based procedural defects)
- United States v. Vargas, 915 F.3d 417 (7th Cir. 2019) (courts should resolve statutory and rule claims before reaching constitutional questions)
- United States v. Gibbs, 182 F.3d 408 (6th Cir. 1999) (Rule 43 protections compared to constitutional protections)
- United States v. Bethea, 888 F.3d 864 (7th Cir. 2018) (standard of review for legal questions and precedents cited regarding Rule 43)