United States v. David Reinhart
893 F.3d 606
9th Cir.2018Background
- David Reinhart pleaded guilty to two counts of possession of child pornography under 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B). At sentencing the government sought a ten-year mandatory minimum under 18 U.S.C. § 2252(b)(2) based on Reinhart’s prior California convictions.
- Reinhart previously had misdemeanor convictions (2002) under Cal. Penal Code § 311.11(a) (possession of matter depicting minors in sexual conduct) and Cal. Penal Code § 311.3(a) (sexual exploitation of a child).
- § 2252(b)(2) imposes a ten-year mandatory minimum if the defendant has a prior state conviction “relating to … the production, possession … of child pornography.” Chapter 110 defines “child pornography” and “sexually explicit conduct” at 18 U.S.C. § 2256.
- The government urged a broad reading of “relating to” (arguing Sullivan permits a non‑categorical, relation-based inquiry); Reinhart urged the categorical (Taylor) approach, contending the California statutes are broader than the federal definition.
- The district court applied the categorical approach (relying on Mellouli and Chavez‑Solis), found both California statutes overbroad and indivisible, and declined to apply the ten‑year mandatory minimum. The Ninth Circuit affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether § 2252(b)(2)’s phrase “relating to … possession … of child pornography” requires the Taylor categorical approach or allows a broader relation-based inquiry | Government: “relating to” permits a broader comparison; Sullivan supports non-categorical inquiry for § 2252(b)(2) | Reinhart: apply usual categorical approach; § 2256 provides definitional anchors that require a narrow reading | Court: apply categorical approach for the “child pornography” clause because chapter 110 defines the terms, so “relating to” is read narrowly |
| Whether Cal. Penal Code § 311.11(a) is a categorical match to federal “child pornography” definition | Government: prior possession conviction should trigger enhancement | Reinhart: § 311.11(a) is overbroad (includes conduct broader than federal definition) | Court: § 311.11(a) is overbroad and indivisible; does not trigger § 2252(b)(2) |
| Whether Cal. Penal Code § 311.3(a) is a categorical match to federal “child pornography” definition | Government: prior sexual exploitation conviction should trigger enhancement | Reinhart: § 311.3(a) includes conduct (defecation/urination for sexual stimulation) outside federal definition | Court: § 311.3(a) is overbroad and indivisible; does not trigger § 2252(b)(2) |
| Whether the court should use the modified categorical approach for these statutes | Government: if overbroad, may still “relate to” under broader test | Reinhart: statutes are indivisible so modified categorical approach not available | Court: statutes are indivisible; modified categorical approach not available; no § 2252(b)(2) enhancement |
Key Cases Cited
- Mellouli v. Lynch, 135 S. Ct. 1980 (2015) (words “relating to” may be read narrowly where statutory context and definitional cross‑references anchor the phrase)
- Sullivan v. United States, 797 F.3d 623 (9th Cir. 2015) (generally applied categorical approach but held some § 2252(b)(2) clauses may be read broadly for undefined terms)
- Chavez‑Solis v. Lynch, 803 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2015) (Cal. Penal Code § 311.11(a) is overbroad compared to federal child pornography definition)
- Sinerius v. Holder, 504 F.3d 737 (9th Cir. 2007) (interpreting “relating to” language in sexual‑offense context and principles of chapter‑specific definitions)
- Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254 (2013) (divisibility and modified categorical approach framework)
- Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990) (established categorical approach for ACCA and analogous predicates)
- Moncrieffe v. Holder, 569 U.S. 184 (2013) (focus on what the conviction necessarily established, not underlying facts)