United States v. David Major, 33 F.4th 370

Background

In Dec. 2018, A.K. died of combined toxic effects of acetyl fentanyl, fentanyl, and mitragynine after injecting drugs she purchased from Dawn Bukowski. Bukowski had bought the drugs from David Major.
Police conducted controlled buys from Major in Feb.–Mar. 2019; two associates (Lobb and Menchaca) were arrested with heroin/fentanyl and gave statements implicating Major in a distribution conspiracy.
Major pleaded guilty (no plea agreement) to one conspiracy count and two distribution counts admitting he distributed heroin and fentanyl. PSR attributed ~100+ g heroin and increased fentanyl amount to Major’s conduct.
While on bail, Lobb reported being approached at work by Major’s associate (“Ray Ray”), and recorded jail calls showed Major urging others to contact Lobb and ‘‘clean it up’’—evidence the court found showed attempted witness influence.
The PSR applied a leadership enhancement, an obstruction enhancement based on the recorded calls/contacts, denied acceptance-of-responsibility credit, and designated Major a career offender (prior felony drug and aggravated kidnapping convictions), producing a Guidelines range capped by the 20‑year statutory maximum.
At sentencing Major contested (1) that he supplied the drugs causing A.K.’s death, (2) the obstruction finding, (3) denial of acceptance credit, and (4) the career‑offender classification; the district court rejected these objections and imposed a 240‑month sentence. The Seventh Circuit affirmed.

Issues

Issue	Major's Argument	Government's Argument	Held
Whether the court clearly erred in finding Major supplied the drugs that contributed to A.K.’s death	Major: A.K. must have gotten additional drugs elsewhere; his sale didn’t cause the overdose	Gov: Bukowski’s credible testimony, texts, Uber records, and autopsy support that A.K. left with drugs from Major and later died from those substances	Court: No clear error; affirmed (district court permissibly credited Bukowski and corroborating evidence)
Whether the court erred in finding Major obstructed justice by attempting to influence Lobb	Major: He only urged Lobb to “tell the truth,” not to threaten or suborn perjury	Gov: Major’s recorded calls, use of an enforcer, and efforts to have Lobb change testimony show an attempt to influence a witness	Court: No clear error; conduct fit obstruction examples (per Cheek) and supported enhancement/consideration
Whether Major demonstrated acceptance of responsibility	Major: Guilty plea and allocution showed remorse; counsel’s objections should not defeat credit	Gov: Major minimized conduct, disputed relevant facts at allocution, and engaged in obstruction—undermining acceptance	Court: No clear error; denial of §3E1.1 credit upheld given obstruction and defendant’s minimizations/denials
Whether sentencing as a career offender was substantively unreasonable	Major: Old kidnapping conviction (1993) overstates criminal history and is unrelated; court should have departed	Gov: Career‑offender designation applies and court adequately weighed §3553(a) factors	Court: No abuse of discretion; within‑Guidelines sentence presumed reasonable and court gave adequate individualized reasons

Key Cases Cited

United States v. Faulkner, 885 F.3d 488 (7th Cir. 2018) (procedural‑error standards for sentencing review)
United States v. Ranjel, 872 F.3d 815 (7th Cir. 2017) (clear‑error review of sentencing factual findings)
United States v. Cheek, 740 F.3d 440 (7th Cir. 2014) (vicarious efforts to influence witness testimonial example of obstruction)
United States v. Purchess, 107 F.3d 1261 (7th Cir. 1997) (distinguishing counsel’s factual challenges from defendant’s own denials for acceptance credit)
Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338 (2007) (presumption of reasonableness for within‑Guidelines sentences)
Burrage v. United States, 571 U.S. 204 (2014) (but‑for causation standard for statutory death enhancement)
United States v. Lawler, 818 F.3d 281 (7th Cir. 2016) (sentencing court may consider that death resulted even if statutory causation not proved)
United States v. Lucas, 670 F.3d 784 (7th Cir. 2012) (preponderance and reliability standards for facts at sentencing)