United States v. David James Cook
2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 22226
| 8th Cir. | 2012Background
- Cook pled guilty to drug conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute oxycodone and to assault resulting in serious bodily injury.
- Drug sentence: 165 months, based on guidelines and career offender status, to run concurrently with assault sentence.
- Assault sentence: 120 months, to run concurrently with drug sentence; plea agreement anticipated concurrent sentences and possible acceptance of responsibility.
- Cook stole some undercover oxycodone during controlled purchase, affecting cooperation considerations.
- District court considered Cook’s extensive violent criminal history and its impact on protecting the public, and declined a downward variance.
- Williams pleaded guilty to conspiracy and received probation after government downward departure; Cook challenged disparity.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the 165-month drug sentence is substantively reasonable | Cook asserts the sentence is substantively unreasonable. | State court reasons, including career offender status and prior history, support the sentence. | Sentence presumptively reasonable; no abuse of discretion. |
| Whether the district court erred in denying acceptance of responsibility variance | Cook argues acceptance of responsibility should reduce sentence due to cooperation. | Court properly denied variance due to theft and non-cooperation implications. | No abuse; no downward variance for acceptance of responsibility. |
| Whether court relied improperly on post-offense conduct to justify sentence | Cook contends post-offense conduct should not affect sentencing. | Court properly considered ongoing conduct as part of § 3553(a) factors. | Court did not abuse discretion; continued conduct permissible in weighing factors. |
| Whether double-counting of criminal history invalidly inflated the sentence | Cook claims district court double-counted criminal history. | Any double-counting is permissible; history still relevant under § 3553(a) and career offender rules. | Not error; permissible distinction between career offender status and history assessment. |
| Whether disparity with Williams’ sentence is unwarranted | Disparity between Cook’s long sentence and Williams’ probation is unwarranted. | Legitimate differences in criminal histories and guidelines outcomes justify disparity. | No abuse; legitimate distinctions support differing sentences. |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Stanko, 491 F.3d 408 (8th Cir. 2007) (presumptive reasonableness of within-Guidelines sentences)
- Chay-Velasquez v. Ashcroft, 367 F.3d 751 (8th Cir. 2004) (need for meaningful argument on appeal; waiver of claims)
- United States v. Struzik, 572 F.3d 484 (8th Cir. 2009) (abuse of discretion standard for substantive reasonableness)
- United States v. Watson, 480 F.3d 1175 (8th Cir. 2007) (weighing factors and importance of proper sentencing decisions)
- United States v. Ngo, 132 F.3d 1231 (8th Cir. 1997) (continued criminal conduct can affect acceptance of responsibility)
- United States v. Pirani, 406 F.3d 543 (8th Cir. 2005) (plain error review for unraised sentencing issues; en banc)
- United States v. Barrett, 552 F.3d 724 (8th Cir. 2009) (criminal history may be considered even if in history category)
- United States v. Davis-Bey, 605 F.3d 479 (8th Cir. 2010) (legitimate distinctions between co-defendants justify different sentences)
- United States v. Olunloyo, 10 F.3d 578 (8th Cir. 1993) (sentencing error did not prejudice where longer concurrent sentence)