United States v. David Jackson, Jr.
713 F. App'x 172
| 4th Cir. | 2017Background
- David Jackson Jr. pled guilty to one count of bank robbery (18 U.S.C. § 2113) and received a 140‑month sentence, enhanced under the Sentencing Guidelines as a career offender (USSG § 4B1.1).
- The district court treated two prior Georgia convictions—robbery and attempted robbery—as "crimes of violence" and used the modified categorical approach to classify them as career‑offender predicates.
- Jackson appealed, arguing neither prior Georgia robbery nor attempted robbery categorically qualifies as a "crime of violence" under the career‑offender guideline.
- The Fourth Circuit considered whether Georgia’s robbery statute (Ga. Code Ann. § 16‑8‑40(a)) is divisible (allowing the modified categorical approach) or indivisible (requiring a categorical comparison of the statute to the Guideline definitions).
- The court analyzed Georgia’s statutory text and Pattern Jury Instructions and concluded the alternatives (force, intimidation, sudden snatching, etc.) are alternative means, not separate elements—so the statute is indivisible.
- Because Georgia robbery can encompass nonviolent ‘‘sudden snatching,’’ it is broader than the generic, violence‑required definition of robbery and therefore cannot categorically qualify under either the Guidelines’ force clause or the enumerated‑offense clause; the career‑offender enhancement was invalidated and the case was vacated and remanded for resentencing.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Jackson's prior Georgia robbery convictions qualify as "crime[s] of violence" for career‑offender enhancement | Jackson: Georgia robbery (and attempted robbery) do not categorically qualify because the statute is indivisible and covers nonviolent conduct | Government: Prior convictions can be analyzed under the modified categorical approach (statute divisible) or are categorically violent (robbery is enumerated) | The court held the Georgia robbery statute is indivisible; categorical approach applies and Georgia robbery is broader than generic robbery, so convictions do not qualify as career‑offender predicates |
| Whether the Georgia robbery statute is divisible (elements) or indivisible (means) | Jackson: Alternatives in § 16‑8‑40(a) are means, not elements; jury unanimity on a particular means is not required | Government: Alternatives are distinct elements permitting the modified categorical approach | The court held Georgia Pattern Jury Instructions show jurors need only find one means, so the statute is indivisible |
| Whether robbery under Georgia law satisfies the Guidelines’ force clause | Jackson: Only some means (force, intimidation) involve force; statute allows nonviolent forms like sudden snatching, so not categorically a violent crime | Government: Prior convictions qualify under force clause (or via modified approach identifying violent means) | The court held the statute is indivisible so categorical analysis applies; because nonviolent means exist, the force clause does not categorically cover Georgia robbery |
| Whether Georgia robbery qualifies under the Guidelines’ enumerated‑offense clause (generic robbery) | Jackson: Georgia robbery is broader than the generic definition (MPC/majority states require use/threat of violence) | Government: Robbery is enumerated and should count as a predicate | The court held Georgia robbery is broader than the generic robbery definition and therefore does not categorically qualify under the enumerated clause |
Key Cases Cited
- Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276 (2013) (explaining categorical and modified categorical approaches)
- Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243 (2016) (distinguishing elements from means for divisibility analysis)
- Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990) (framework for determining generic offense for enumerated‑offense comparisons)
- United States v. Gardner, 823 F.3d 793 (4th Cir. 2016) (holding robbery statute indivisible when jury need not agree on means)
- United States v. Fuertes, 805 F.3d 485 (4th Cir. 2015) (indivisible statutes that allow violent and nonviolent commission do not categorically qualify)
- United States v. Peterson, 629 F.3d 432 (4th Cir. 2011) (approach to defining generic offense for career‑offender analysis)
- United States v. Dozier, 848 F.3d 180 (4th Cir. 2017) (treatment of attempt convictions in career‑offender analysis)