United States v. David Diehl, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 2548

Background

Defendant David Diehl was convicted of child pornography offenses and sentenced in Oct. 2011 to 600 months plus a $1,000 special assessment and a $1,000 fine; the court orally ordered the special assessment paid immediately and the written judgment directed payment of the special assessment to begin immediately and that the fine be paid “as soon as possible” if not payable "at this time."
By Sept. 2015 Diehl had paid only $446.46; the Government learned Diehl had about $1,800 in his inmate trust (commissary) account.
The Government filed for a turnover order under Texas’s turnover statute to collect the unpaid criminal monetary penalties by directing BOP to turn over funds from Diehl’s inmate account.
Diehl (pro se) opposed, arguing (1) the FDCPA precludes use of state turnover procedures to collect criminal fines and (2) his voluntary participation in BOP’s Inmate Financial Responsibility Program (IFRP) bars immediate collection so long as he is complying with IFRP.
The district court granted the turnover order; Diehl appealed. The Fifth Circuit affirmed.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
1. May the Government use state turnover procedures to collect criminal monetary penalties?	The Government: FDCPA allows collection by federal or state civil-judgment procedures; state turnover statutes remain available.	Diehl: FDCPA limits collection to remedies in the Act and therefore precludes state turnover.	Held: FDCPA does not preclude state-law collection mechanisms; Government may use Texas turnover statute.
2. Does participation in IFRP bar immediate collection from an inmate’s trust account while IFRP payments are current?	The Government: IFRP is voluntary and does not supersede a court’s immediate-payment obligation or the Government’s collection authority.	Diehl: Active, compliant IFRP participation creates an implied installment plan that prevents other collection methods.	Held: IFRP does not create a court-ordered installment plan or shield inmate funds; Government may collect immediately absent contrary language in the judgment.
3. Was the judgment ambiguous as to timing of payment of the fine?	The Government: Judgment and sentencing directives required immediate payment absent a specified schedule or date.	Diehl: Written language (“as soon as possible”) suggests non-immediate timing or reliance on IFRP.	Held: Judgment required immediate payment; “as soon as possible/at this time” language did not create a date-certain or installment plan.
4. Did the Government exceed the judgment by seizing commissary funds?	The Government: Its actions were consistent with lien and collection authority under 18 U.S.C. §§ 3612–3613.	Diehl: Turning over commissary funds exceeded judgment terms and unfairly bypassed IFRP.	Held: Turning over surplus inmate trust funds was consistent with the judgment and statutory collection authority.

Key Cases Cited

United States v. Phillips, 303 F.3d 548 (5th Cir.) (FDCPA is the federal framework for enforcing civil judgments; federal collection practices apply)
United States v. Elashi, 789 F.3d 547 (5th Cir.) (FDCPA did not eliminate state-law collection mechanisms; §3003(b) preserves other federal or state collection rights)
Auclair v. Sher, 63 F.3d 407 (5th Cir.) (criminal fines create an automatic lien in favor of the United States at time of judgment)
United States v. Coluccio, 19 F.3d 1115 (6th Cir.) (absent specified payment schedule, statute demands immediate payment; other collection means permitted)
United States v. Pacheco-Alvarado, 782 F.3d 213 (5th Cir.) (BOP IFRP is a mechanism to help inmates pay fines, but does not preclude deviations or other collection)
United States v. Ekong, 518 F.3d 285 (5th Cir.) (government may pursue immediate collection where judgment permits)
McGhee v. Clark, 166 F.3d 884 (7th Cir.) (BOP payment schedule under IFRP does not conflict with a sentencing court’s immediate-payment order)