United States v. David Casillas
830 F.3d 403
6th Cir.2016Background
- Antonio Rios and David Casillas were tried (with 29 co-defendants; others pleaded guilty) on a RICO conspiracy (Count One) alleging the Holland Latin Kings were tied to the national organization, and on drug-conspiracy counts (notably Count Fourteen: ≥5 kg cocaine). Both were convicted on RICO and the cocaine conspiracy; Rios acquitted on a marijuana conspiracy and several assault special allegations.
- Government presented national-organization expert (Bevacqui) and local investigator/expert (Det. Kristopher Haglund); many cooperating co-defendants corroborated violent and drug-trafficking conduct of the Holland chapter.
- At sentencing, both received multi‑decade terms based on relevant-conduct drug quantities, firearms and violence enhancements, leadership and obstruction findings; Rios received a 300-month sentence, Casillas 360 months (each with credit for time served).
- Defendants appealed, raising numerous trial challenges (expert admissibility and mixing of fact/expert testimony, Confrontation/hearsay, tattoo and other‑acts evidence, suppression of seized cocaine, jury instructions) and sentencing challenges (drug quantity, firearm, obstruction, assault enhancements).
- The Sixth Circuit affirmed both convictions and sentences, finding most evidentiary rulings within the district court’s discretion, any errors harmless, and sentencing findings supported by the record.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Admissibility of national gang expert (Bevacqui) | Expert irrelevant/unreliable because he lacked direct experience with Holland chapter | Government: Bevacqui addressed national Latin Kings features; other witnesses tied national traits to Holland | Admitted; expert properly limited to national organization and was reliable when combined with other testimony |
| Admissibility/mixing by case agent expert (Haglund) | Haglund blurred fact and expert testimony, opined on specific acts and guilt | Government: testimony largely proper; some factual testimony was intrinsic and corroborated | Some Haglund testimony exceeded Rule 702/became confusing due to dual role, but error harmless given corroboration |
| Confrontation Clause re: expert reliance on hearsay | Experts (esp. Haglund) based opinions on testimonial hearsay and relayed it to jury | Government: experts may rely on hearsay if they exercise independent judgment; only prohibited if they parrot statements | One discrete Haglund statement recounting an informant’s description of a specific beating violated Crawford but was harmless due to corroborating witness testimony |
| Gang‑tattoo evidence (Rios’s scale tattoo) | Tattoos irrelevant/prejudicial under Rule 403; scale tattoo not linked to Latin Kings | Government: tattoos probative of affiliation or expressive admission of priorities (guns/drugs over religion) | Most tattoo evidence admissible as gang‑membership proof; Rios’s scale tattoo admitted in error under Rule 403 but error was harmless |
| Admission of other members’ violent acts in RICO trial | Evidence of acts by other Holland Latin Kings was unfairly prejudicial | Government: acts were intrinsic to proving enterprise and pattern of racketeering | Admissible; RICO conspiracy may be proven with acts of others and evidence was probative and not unduly prejudicial |
| Hearsay re controlled buys and informants (Agent Yandl, Solano) | Statements constituted inadmissible hearsay/co‑conspirator hearsay not shown to meet Rule 801(d)(2)(E) | Government: testimony explained officers’ actions or was admissible co‑conspirator evidence | Statements were admissible to explain police conduct or as non‑hearsay background; no reversible error |
| Suppression of cocaine seized after cell‑phone tracking and traffic stop | Cell‑phone tracking and dog sniff were unlawful (privacy/stop duration) | Government: real‑time location not private (Skinner); corroborated tips gave reasonable suspicion to extend stop for a sniff | Denial of suppression affirmed: Skinner controls on location data; officers had reasonable suspicion to continue stop and dog alert justified search |
| Jury instructions (reasonable doubt & unanimity) | Court altered pattern reasonable‑doubt wording and denied unanimity on racketeering predicate types | Defendants: wording lowered burden; unanimity required as to types/categories of predicate acts | Instructional wording acceptable (no reasonable likelihood it lowered burden); unanimity on specific overt acts not required for RICO conspiracy and any error harmless because jury unanimously found ≥5 kg cocaine |
| Sentencing—drug‑quantity attribution | District court erred in attributing ≥15 kg when jury convicted of ≥5 kg | Defendants: sentencing should be limited to jury’s finding or more precise proof | Court affirmed: sentencing relevant‑conduct standard permits preponderance findings; 15 kg finding not clearly erroneous |
| Sentencing—firearm enhancement (§2D1.1(b)(1)) | Rios argued inconsistency (court sustained Casillas’s objection) | Government: firearms possessed during relevant conduct; presumption connecting weapon to offense; defendants didn’t rebut | Enhancement sustained for Rios (and analyzed per preponderance/Darwich framework); Casillas had firearm enhancement vacated at sentencing but Rios didn’t rebut presumption |
| Sentencing—obstruction enhancement (§3C1.1) | Rios: acquittal on related assault undercuts Leal’s credibility and enhancement | Government: bribery/offer to pay witness is obstruction; preponderance applies | Enhancement affirmed: district court found Leal credible and that Rios attempted to obstruct; acquittal on assault did not preclude enhancement |
| Sentencing—assault‑with‑intent‑to‑murder enhancement | Casillas: enhancement requires specific intent; district court conflated recklessness and intent | Casillas: contested scoring for Olivares assault | Court found preponderance support (statements like “Die, motherfucker” plus severe beating) and upheld §2A2.1 enhancement |
Key Cases Cited
- Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579 (gatekeeping reliability of expert testimony)
- Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (applying Daubert to non‑scientific experts)
- United States v. Mejia, 545 F.3d 179 (2d Cir. 2008) (limits on gang‑expert testimony and risks of parroting fact evidence)
- United States v. Tocco, 200 F.3d 401 (6th Cir. 2000) (permitting law‑enforcement expert testimony about organized‑crime structure and dual‑role cautions)
- Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (Confrontation Clause bars testimonial hearsay absent prior opportunity for cross‑examination)
- Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1 (trial courts may define reasonable doubt but must avoid wording likely to lower standard)
- Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 52 (RICO conspiracy need not allege or prove overt act)
- United States v. Skinner, 690 F.3d 772 (6th Cir.) (no reasonable expectation of privacy in real‑time cell‑site location data)
- United States v. Darwich, 337 F.3d 645 (6th Cir.) (framework for §2D1.1 firearm enhancement and Darwich presumption)