960 F.3d 767
6th Cir.2020Background
- Federal agents indicted David Lynn Buie for two counts of felonious possession of firearms after surveillance showed him pawning multiple guns; Buie pleaded guilty.
- A presentence report identified five prior Tennessee felony convictions as potential ACCA predicate "violent felonies": voluntary manslaughter, arson (Tenn. Code Ann. §39-3-202 (repealed)), two aggravated burglaries (Tenn. Code Ann. §39-14-403), and one second-degree burglary.
- The district court accepted manslaughter as a violent felony, excluded aggravated burglary based on earlier Sixth Circuit precedent, but deemed arson and second-degree burglary to qualify; it imposed the 180‑month ACCA mandatory minimum (concurrent counts).
- After the Supreme Court decision in United States v. Stitt, Tennessee aggravated burglary was held to correspond to generic burglary, restoring its status as an ACCA predicate; Buie then challenged aggravated burglary and argued arson and burglary were overbroad under the categorical approach.
- The Sixth Circuit concluded aggravated burglary (per circuit precedent) and the Tennessee arson statute each correspond to their generic counterparts for ACCA purposes, so Buie has at least three violent felonies and qualifies for ACCA’s 180‑month mandatory minimum; the judgment was affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Buie) | Defendant's Argument (Government) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Tennessee aggravated burglary (§39‑14‑403) is a "violent felony" under ACCA | Aggravated burglary is overbroad (entry-by-instrument can be mere attempt) and thus may not match generic burglary | Prior precedent and Tennessee law show aggravated burglary corresponds to generic burglary | Aggravated burglary is an ACCA predicate (precedent forecloses Buie) |
| Whether Tennessee arson (§39‑3‑202) is divisible and matches generic arson (act element) | Statute is indivisible and may criminalize only aiding/procurement, which could be broader than generic arson | Statute is indivisible but aiders/principals commit the same substantive crime; act element corresponds to generic arson | Arson statute is indivisible but aiding/abetting is the same crime as direct arson; matches generic act element |
| Whether Tennessee arson requires a mens rea matching generic arson | Aiding/procuring language does not necessarily import "willfully and maliciously" for aiders; mens rea may be too lenient | The modifiers "willfully and maliciously" apply to the whole series; Tennessee law requires purposeful aiding/procuring | Tennessee arson requires at least knowledge/willfulness for aiders; mens rea matches generic arson |
| Whether Buie qualifies as an armed career criminal under ACCA | Only manslaughter qualifies; without others he does not meet the three‑felony trigger | At least three prior convictions (manslaughter, aggravated burglary, arson) qualify | Buie has at least three ACCA violent felonies and ACCA 180‑month sentence is affirmed |
Key Cases Cited
- Brumbach v. United States, 929 F.3d 791 (6th Cir. 2019) (circuit precedent on Tennessee aggravated burglary)
- United States v. Stitt, 139 S. Ct. 399 (2018) (Supreme Court: Tennessee aggravated burglary corresponds to generic burglary)
- Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990) (categorical approach for ACCA predicates)
- Moncrieffe v. Holder, 569 U.S. 184 (2013) (focus on minimum conduct criminalized by statute)
- Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243 (2016) (divisibility analysis under the categorical approach)
- Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254 (2013) (distinguishing divisible and indivisible statutes)
- United States v. Richardson, 948 F.3d 733 (6th Cir. 2020) (aiding and abetting treated as substantive crime for ACCA purposes)
- United States v. Gatson, 776 F.3d 405 (6th Cir. 2015) (mens rea analysis for generic arson)
- United States v. Brown, 957 F.3d 679 (6th Cir. 2020) (treatment of entry-by-instrument argument)
- Cradler v. United States, 891 F.3d 659 (6th Cir. 2018) (guidance comparing Tennessee statutes to generic offenses)