United States v. David Bronstein, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 3827

Background

On April 1, 2015, seven protesters (Appellees) disrupted a Supreme Court oral-argument session by standing, speaking short statements or singing, and were removed and arrested; the disturbance lasted ~2–4 minutes.
The U.S. Attorney charged Appellees under 40 U.S.C. § 6134 (prohibiting discharge of firearms, fireworks, making a "harangue or oration," or uttering "loud" language on Supreme Court premises) and 18 U.S.C. § 1507; Appellees challenged § 6134 as void for vagueness.
The district court: upheld a narrowing construction of "loud" (limited to utterances that disturbed or tended to disturb Court operations) but struck the words "harangue" and "oration" as unconstitutionally vague.
The government appealed the void-for-vagueness ruling as to "harangue" and "oration." The parties did not pursue a First Amendment challenge on appeal.
The D.C. Circuit reviewed the vagueness question de novo and applied traditional rules of statutory interpretation to determine whether the terms provide fair notice and a discernible legal standard.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the terms "harangue" and "oration" in 40 U.S.C. § 6134 are unconstitutionally vague	Bronstein argued the terms lack objective meaning and depend on subjective perceptions and sensitivities, so they give no fair notice	Government argued the words have settled meanings (public speeches) and, read in context, reach public speeches that tend to disrupt Court operations	Court reversed: "harangue" and "oration" are not void for vagueness when interpreted to mean making public speeches to persons in the Supreme Court building/grounds in a manner that tends to disturb Court operations and decorum
Whether the statute can be saved by judicial construction	Bronstein maintained the terms are irredeemably vague and cannot be narrowed	Government contended traditional interpretive tools (dictionary meaning, context, statutory purpose) supply a core meaning that saves the terms	Court applied statutory construction principles and found a constitutionally adequate, objective core meaning; construction saves the terms
Whether the defendants’ conduct plausibly falls within the statute's core meaning	Bronstein argued the conduct was brief and not clearly prohibited by the challenged words	Government argued the coordinated standing and directed statements to Justices/audience objectively resembled public speeches that disturbed oral argument	Court indicated a person of ordinary intelligence could understand that making disruptive speeches during oral argument is proscribed and remanded for further proceedings
Standard of review for vagueness challenge	Bronstein asserted the terms fail under ordinary-person fair-notice analysis	Government argued vagueness must be assessed using statutory interpretation and context, not ad hoc subjective appraisals	Court reiterated vagueness doctrine is grounded in statutory interpretation and applied de novo review, rejecting the district court's categorical invalidation

Key Cases Cited

Hodge v. Talkin, 799 F.3d 1145 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (upholding a related statute restricting expressive activity at the Supreme Court and discussing statutory context and decorum interests)
Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015) (void-for-vagueness framework; terms lacking statutory definitions or narrowing context are suspect)
Coates v. Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611 (1971) (statute void where it specified no standard of conduct at all)
Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972) (read statutory terms in context; disturbance standard tied to disruption of governmental functions)
Bouie v. Columbia, 378 U.S. 347 (1964) (vagueness inquiry relies on statute and pertinent law, not subjective expectations)
Williams v. United States, 553 U.S. 285 (2008) (terms are void for vagueness when they lack statutory definitions, narrowing context, or settled legal meanings)