United States v. David Braxton, 456 F. App'x 242

Braxton was convicted of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon and sentenced under the Armed Career Criminal Act after trial.
Police stopped Braxton’s car in Baltimore May 17, 2006 due to bad tags, tinted windows, and neighborhood danger, during which Braxton was nervous.
Officer Williams frisked Braxton after Braxton exited the car; a gun was found and used to justify the stop/search.
Braxton was indicted in 2007, the first indictment was dismissed without prejudice in 2008 due to an officer’s deployment, and a second indictment was returned on September 17, 2008.
Braxton moved to suppress the gun and to dismiss the indictment; motions were resolved March 16, 2009, after a three-day trial.
Braxton was sentenced September 4, 2009, challenged on grounds including suppression, ineffective assistance, and speedy-trial rights; the district court denied relief and this appeal followed.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Was the pat-down of Braxton on a Terry stop proper?	Braxton	Braxton contends the district court erred by not requiring the Terry frisk to be based on armed-and-dangerous suspicion.	Yes; the panel affirmed the frisk based on reasonable suspicion Braxton was involved in auto theft and armed/dangerous.
Was trial counsel ineffective for not obtaining the KGA tape?	Braxton	Braxton argues counsel’s failure to obtain the tape prejudiced the defense.	No; counsel’s performance was reasonable under Strickland; the tape’s nonexistence and CAD report sufficed, and Braxton rejected plea offers despite counsel’s advice.
Did the Speedy Trial Act and Barker framework require dismissal or show violation?	Braxton	Braxton claims violation of speedy-trial rights due to delay; timing falls outside permitted window.	No; delays were excludable for pretrial motions and other permissible periods; Barker factors did not show prejudice.
Were any other claimed errors (indictment reassignment, grand jury resubmission, ACCA predicate) meritorious?	Braxton	Braxton asserts multiple miscellaneous errors.	No; the court rejected these arguments as unsupported or unpersuasive.

Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (U.S. 1968) (establishes Terry stop and frisk standards for reasonable suspicion and weapons frisk)
Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323 (U.S. 2009) (pat-downs require armed-and-dangerous suspicion for drivers and passengers during stops)
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (U.S. 1984) (deficient performance and prejudice standard for ineffective assistance of counsel)
Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (U.S. 1972) (four-factor test for speedy-trial claims (length, reason, timely assertion, prejudice))
United States v. Powell, 666 F.3d 180 (4th Cir. 2011) (cautions against overly granular appellate fact-finding and cobbling facts to establish reasonable suspicion)
United States v. Hamlin, 319 F.3d 666 (4th Cir. 2003) (standard for reviewing suppression rulings (fact review de novo, law de novo))