United States v. Davenport, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 152

DEA searches of Davenport’s storage unit and home uncovered cocaine, drug paraphernalia, cash, and a loaded 9mm pistol in a Cadillac; Davenport admitted drug activity and gun ownership and cooperated with agents.
Davenport pleaded guilty to a superseding information charging conspiracy to distribute cocaine and crack under a plea agreement that listed joint sentencing recommendations and reserved rights for the Government to provide relevant information to the court and Probation.
Paragraph 14 of the plea agreement originally listed a firearm possession recommendation but the clause "and the defendant possessed a firearm" was later struck; the agreement also stated these recommendations were not binding and the Government could present all relevant information at sentencing.
At sentencing the Probation Office applied a two-level gun enhancement under USSG §2D1.1(b)(1); the Government responded to Davenport’s objections when the court asked and argued the gun’s location supported the enhancement.
Davenport was sentenced to 199 months; he later filed a §2255 motion claiming trial counsel was ineffective for not arguing that the Government breached the plea agreement by advocating the gun enhancement.
The District Court denied relief; the Third Circuit affirmed, holding the Government did not breach the plea agreement and therefore counsel was not ineffective.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the Government breached the plea agreement by advocating a two-level gun enhancement at sentencing	Davenport: Striking the firearm stipulation in Paragraph 14 meant the Government agreed not to pursue or advocate a gun enhancement	Government: Strike only removed Davenport’s stipulation; other plea provisions expressly permitted the Government to present and argue relevant information at sentencing	No breach: plea read as whole shows Government retained flexibility to present/argue relevant facts, including the firearm enhancement
Whether counsel was ineffective for failing to argue breach	Davenport: Counsel should have argued that the Government breached the plea agreement by pursuing the enhancement	Government: No breach occurred, so no meritorious failure to raise	Held: Not ineffective—no breach existed, so counsel had no viable claim to press

United States v. Nolan-Cooper, 155 F.3d 221 (3d Cir. 1998) (three-step analysis for alleged plea-agreement breach)
United States v. Moscahlaidis, 868 F.2d 1357 (3d Cir. 1989) (government must adhere strictly to plea bargain terms)
United States v. Hodge, 412 F.3d 479 (3d Cir. 2005) (objective, common-law-contract approach to interpreting plea agreements)
United States v. Schwartz, 511 F.3d 403 (3d Cir. 2008) (plea agreements interpreted as a whole; ambiguous provisions construed for defendant)
United States v. Scott, 469 F.3d 1335 (10th Cir. 2006) (contrasting precedent where court found breach when plea limited sentencing positions)
United States v. Smack, 347 F.3d 533 (3d Cir. 2003) (standard of review for ineffective-assistance claims)
NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550 (U.S. 2014) (quoted for illustrating a logical fallacy; not central to plea analysis)