United States v. Daughtry, 1:11-cr-00302

Gadsden was convicted at trial of bank fraud, identity theft, and evidence tampering following a double jury-trial process.
The Housing Authority's Section 8 program funds were routed via Bank of America and later moved through accounts controlled by Gadsden and co-conspirators via unauthorized ACH transfers totaling about $1.4 million.
Gadsden formed fraudulent entities (Daughtry LLC and Fisher LLC) and used forged/duplicated documents to open Bank of America accounts to receive illicit transfers.
Emails associated with the scheme were deleted shortly after FBI contact, with IP evidence linking deletions to Gadsden’s address.
The government presented testimony from housing authority staff, bank investigators, and others to prove a risk of loss to Bank of America and the involved entities, and the defense contested the sufficiency of that proof.
Gadsden moved for judgments of acquittal and a new trial; the government moved to strike pro se filings and sought leave to file a surreply.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether evidence suffices for bank fraud counts	Gadsden exposed banks to loss or risk via ACH transfers.	No proof that Bank of America was an intended victim or suffered loss.	Sufficient evidence Bank of America exposed to risk of loss; counts affirmed
Effect of pro se filings by represented defendant	Local Rules prohibit pro se filings by represented parties; motions should be struck.	Rights to pro se filings preserved; pro se motions were properly before court.	Pro se filings properly declined; motions considered only through counsel
Sufficiency of evidence for attempted evidence tampering	Circumstantial evidence showed deletion of emails tied to the fraud and intent to destroy evidence.	Deletion lacks direct evidence of intent and sole access by Gadsden.	Circumstantial evidence sufficient; two counts upheld
Standard for judgment of acquittal vs. new trial	Court should apply sufficiency standard for Rule 29, not weight-of-the-evidence standard.	Rule 33 standard allows broader review on weight of the evidence.	Rule 29 and Rule 33 standards appropriately applied; no acquittal or new trial warranted

United States v. Harvey, 532 F.3d 326 (4th Cir. 2008) (standard for reviewing sufficiency of evidence)
Arrington, 757 F.2d 1484 (4th Cir. 1985) (scope of Rule 33 for new trials)
Perry, 335 F.3d 316 (4th Cir. 2003) (new trial should be sparingly granted when evidence weighs heavily against verdict)
United States v. Brandon, 298 F.3d 307 (4th Cir. 2002) (bank fraud elements; bank as intended victim or exposed to risk of loss)
Laljie, 184 F.3d 180 (2d Cir. 1999) (bank victimization in § 1344 requires exposure to risk of loss)
Orr, 932 F.2d 330 (4th Cir. 1991) (distinguishing when bank is not placed at risk)
Khorozian, 333 F.3d 498 (3d Cir. 2003) (bank as target of deception; distinguishing mere instrumentality)